The Relationship Between GL Management Incentive And Performance Of Listed Companies

One of the main characteristics of modern companies is the separation of the two rights between owners and managers,which makes the agency costs of listed companies increase.In order to reduce the cost of principal-agent,the company's owners constantly learn and update the company's internal governance methods---management incentive mechanism,combining management's own interests and company's interests.Whether the management incentive can improve the performance of listed companies has been a hot research in this field.Chinese scholars have a late start in the research on the field of management incentive theory,and the management incentive mechanism is still not perfect,especially in the equity incentive mechanism.In recent years,the continuous updating of corporate governance concept and the booming capital market have provided a good opportunity for perfecting our management incentive mechanism.The research on the management incentive is gradually increasing,and Chinese scholars have a more in-depth understanding of the management incentive theory.This article is based on the previous research and studies the relationship between management incentives and corporate performance,and expects to make modest efforts to improve our management incentive mechanism theory.Based on the literature review of management incentive,the influencing factors of the performance of listed companies and the relationship between them,according to the literature research and theoretical basis of this article,four research assumptions are put forward in this paper.Based on data from 2010-2014 listed companies in China as the research sample,respectively from the monetary compensation incentive,equity incentive management studies these two aspects with the relationship between the performance of listed companies.On the basis of selecting the size of the company's company,the ownership structure and the financial leverage as the control variables,this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the management incentive and the performance of the listed companies through the construction of the multiple regression model;using the PSM analysis method to analyze the relationship between management incentive equity and performance of listed companies.Through the empirical research found that the management of monetary compensation incentive and equity incentives can improve the company's operating performance.Research on property rights,the state-owned holding company's management of monetary compensation incentive effect is better than private;And private holding company management equity incentive effect is better than the state.By comparing different stock options,it is found that the effect of restricted stock incentive is betterthan stock option incentive.Considering the influence of equity concentration,the higher the shareholding concentration,the poorer the incentive effect of equity.The empirical results in this paper can be used to provide reference for the listed companies to select the appropriate management incentive mechanism,so that the listed companies will combine the management's own interests with the company's long-term interests to improve the company's operating performance.