Research On The Impact Of State-owned Enterprise Executive Compensation Reform On Company Performance

In 2003 promulgated the "Interim Measures for the central enterprise performance evaluation"(SASAC No.2)to 2015 promulgated the "central enterprises responsible for the performance evaluation methods"(SASAC No.33)(hereinafter referred to as "the evaluation method"),"the evaluation method" has been revised 5 times process.In fact,every time the introduction of the new "assessment" is to reform the state-owned enterprises are facing the stage when economic environment,and,in order to better implement the Party Central Committee and the State Council for the major strategic plan to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises as the background.Executive compensation is an important part of corporate governance,which has attracted wide attention from all sectors of society,reasonable salary system can not only produce the incentive and restraint of executives,to a certain extent,also can reduce the agency cost.Therefore,in addition to the regulatory authorities,social experts and scholars in universities has been exploring how to establish an effective incentive mechanism of executive compensation and corporate performance linkage,the enthusiasm of enterprise performance appraisal target and how to set up the salary structure,how to arrange in order to maximize the mobilization of executives,and make it better for enterprises to provide services bring more benefits to the enterprise.Firstly the status quo of the salary management of state-owned listed enterprises are analyzed,including the influence on understanding of state-owned enterprises,after nearly two times the salary reform by: executive compensation,change the level of executive compensation gap between the industry status quo,whether executives involved in the company's stock ownership plan,executive compensation and corporate performance correlation etc..In reviewing the current existing problems in the management of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises and the causes on the basis of the case company into the enterprise to conduct field research,through interviews,and business executives refer to enterprise system and financial statements on effects of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises on the performance of the company's research found that:(1)basic salary incentive effect on the current operating performance is not obvious;(2)pay for performance can have a positive effect on the current operating performance;(3)the term of incentive to the enterprise long-term operating performance has a positive effect;(4)the salary to replace the effect of explicit and implicit compensation,incentive compensation level is higher,the substitution effect obviously.Finally,according to the conclusions drawn from this paper,and combined with the problems which confronted in the process of corporate research,this paper puts forward some suggestions for the executive compensation system design of state-owned enterprises.