Research On Ultimate Controlling Shareholders,Debt Financing And Over-investment Of Agricultural Listed Companies

The inefficient investment with the investment has been a close concern issue of academia.Over-investment often causes overcapacity,redundant construction,poor investment efficiency and other consequences.lt is serious damage to national economic development and corporate shareholder interests.So,how to reduce the level of over-investment effectively is of great significance.Free Cash Flow Hypothesis literature that corporate debt financing can effectively curb over-investment,but the premise of the conclusion is the enterprise in the decentralized.China's enterprises are showing significant equity concentration,the majority of enterprises there are the ultimate controlling shareholder.According to Agency Theory,while in the case of equity concentration,the agency problem turns into the agency problem between large shareholders and small shareholders.Therefore,the concentration of equity structure,How does the corporate debt financing affect over-investment?How does the ultimate controlling shareholder affect over-investment?The influence of debt financing and excessive investment relations under the ultimate controlling shareholder will produce what kind of change?Subject to verification and research.China A-share listed agricultural enterprises are selected as the research samples.The data window is from 2009 to 2015,and the data sources are CSMAR database and Juchao net by manual finishing.According to the research content,the application of domestic scholars generally use Richardson residual measurement model to measure the sample enterprise excessive investment levels,according to the related theoretical analysis,debt financing and investment relations measurement model was constructed,the ultimate controlling shareholder and excessive investment relationship econometric model and the influence relation of debt financing and excessive investment ultimate controlling shareholder econometric model.The study found:The state-owned ultimate holding nature of the enterprise does not significantly increase the over-investment status,but the nature of state-owned ultimate holding can weaken the restraint of debt in the level of over-investment,And the weakening effect of the local ultimate holding group is stronger than that of the central ultimate holding group.With the financing convenience of state-owned property right enterprises gradually disappear,the weakening effect by the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder is also continued to subside.The paper has contributed to the relevant research mainly from two aspects:On the one hand is focus analysis of the impact on over-investment from the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder.This is different from the existing documents over-emphasis on the separating extent of ownership and controlling right relations,consistent with the reality characteristics of Chinese enterprises,and enrich the relevant research content;On the other hand,it examines the impact of the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder on the relationship between corporate debt and over-investment.This makes up for the shortcoming of many documents on corporate debt and over-investment relationship,includes the the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder factors which have a greater impact on the relationship between corporate debt and over-investment,and improves the stability of relevant research conclusions.