Research On Effects Of Non-mandatory Auditor Change To Audit Quality

In recent years,the violations of listed companies not only bring huge losses to investors and potential stakeholders,but also constitute the great threat to the effective operation of the securities market in our country.China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Exchange issued and implemented a series of regulatory measures to protect the stability of the securities market and the healthy development of the company.If a listed company violates,it will be punished.And can the auditor as an external supervision issue an audit report which is consistent with the actual situation is worth pondering.If a listed company is punished,it is possible to change auditors.The successor auditor is more vulnerable to the supervision of the regulatory authorities.Therefore,auditor may adopt a rigorous accounting approach,meanwhile the audit quality is also improved.This paper first reviews the related literature about the impact of non-mandatory auditor change on audit quality and the impact of listed companies violation penalties on audit quality.Secondly this paper expounds the concept of the non-mandatory auditor change,the meaning of audit quality and the measurement standards and the listed company's punishment,Finally,according to the information asymmetry theory,the principal-agent theory and the audit risk theory puts forward the hypothesis of the paper.The first hypothesis was after the listed companies got punished by China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Exchange,the non-mandatory auditor change on the audit quality of the positive impact is more significant compared to the listed companies that did not change the auditor.The second hypothesis was the more serious the type of punishment,the positive impact of the non-mandatory auditor changes on audit quality is more significant.For the first hypothesis this paper was done based on 302 samples of listed companies punished by CSRC,SSE and SZSE in 2009-2015 years,constructing the mathematical model with DA as the proxy of audit quality in this paper.Descriptive statistics and correlation test verify my hypothesis.For the second hypothesis this paper was done based on 74 samples of listed companies punished by CSRC,SSE and SZSE and Changed auditor,constructing the mathematical model with DA as the proxy of audit quality in this paper.Descriptive statistics and correlation test verify my hypothesis.Finally,according to the results of the study,relevant policy recommendations are put forward.