A Study On The Relationship Between The Heterogeneity Of Institutional Investors And Firm Performance

Due to the changes of policy,economy and environment,the scale of institutional investors becomes larger and larger in capital markets.Institutional investors start to get rid of negative images and join in corporate governance because of the higher share holding and looser legal environment.They hope that they can get more profits by taking part in corporate governance more actively."Institutional shareholder activism" enhances the speaking right of institutional investors and protects their benefits.They become more and more important in corporate governance.In overseas mature capital markets,institutional investors have been proven to be a important external governance mechanism,they can improve the value of company by changing the short-sights of managers.Our country also makes some rules to guide institutional investors to join in corporate governance,but still have some speculative behaviors.A scholar pointed that "Institutional shareholder activism" would be restricted by law and reality in China.So,as a country of special equity and in the development phase of capital market,it is still a question that institutional investors can raise the level of corporate governance.It needs further study.On abroad,their researches mainly focus on the heterogeneity of institutional investors,but in our country,we still mainly focus on the whole.We are short of the heterogeneity researches of institutional investors.In keeping with the international,this article divides institutional investors into pressure-sensitive institutional investors and pressure-insensitive institutional investors on the basis of the former researches,including home and abroad.At the same time,in order to eliminate some questions such as spurious regression caused by lacking in transmission route researches,this article will choose occupation of funds and correlated guarantee as indicators in this research,it will be more reliable.In the part of research design,this article chooses the long-term performance as dependent variable,in order to eliminate the endogenous between the institutional investors and firm performance,and reflect the long-term impact of institutional investors on performance,and impact of occupation of funds and correlated guarantee on long-term performance.In this paper,we can get some conclusions as following:(1)pressure-insensitive institutional investors can promote the firm performance,and pressure-sensitive institutional investors can’t promote the firm performance;(2)pressure-insensitive institutional investors can reduce occupation of funds and correlated guarantee;but pressure-insensitive institutional investors can’t do it;(3)occupation of funds and correlated guarantee harm to the firm performance;(4)occupation of funds and correlated guarantee play a mediating role between the relationship of pressure-insensitive institutional investors and firm performance;but they can’t play a mediating role between the relationship of pressure-sensitive institutional investors and firm performance,because pressure-sensitive institutional investors can’t promote the firm performance.Through this research,we can make up for gap of recent research,and provide the basis for institutional investors’ developing,and offer reasonable suggestions for relevant departments.