| In recent years,the state-owned enterprise receives a widespread concerns from the society for the high executive pay levels.Chinese government then promulgated policies to reduce the pay of senior executives of state-owned enterprises,which opened the prelude to the reform of state-owned enterprise executive incentive system.Incentive measures as a means to unify the interests between the owner and the manager,“How to design the most effective compensation system for state-owned enterprises executives" has constituted the core of the incentive research.However,there are no proofs to support the feasibility and rationality of mandatory cuts in executive incentive.To figure out the effects of executive incentives,and explore whether the self-interested behavior and the nature of State-owned will weaken the effects of incentives.376 listed companies which have implemented virtual equity incentive during 2006-2013 are selected as research sample,and tested by three-stage DEA and stepwise regression analysis.The results show that: executive compensation and managerial ownership are positively correlated with management efficiency,and there is a quadratic function between the stock option incentive and management efficiency.Executive shareholding will promote self-interested behavior,reducing sensitivity of the correlation between compensation and management efficiency,also the stock option Incentive and management efficiency.The nature of State-owned is poor to limit the self-interested behavior.Therefore,under the existing conditions,there are some difficulties in the reform of incentive system.It is necessary to take corresponding measures according to the behavior of senior executives under different circumstances.At the end of this paper,according to the two dimensions of the degree of industry competition and the degree of government intervention,enterprises are classified into four parts,and some suggestions are put forward for the possible response of the executives. |
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