A Study On The Impact Of Corporate Governance On Cash Dividend And Over-investment

Whether the cash dividend payment can inhibit the excessive investment behavior is very concerned by the scholars,and the influence of the corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between the two is not clear.With the attention of scholars from different perspectives on over-investment behavior,the negative impact is gradually paid by the enterprise as a way of non-effective investment,which can directly lead to the abuse of corporate cash flow and the decrease of value and then serious Affect the company's future financing and distribution decisions.In the fifth session of the Financial Street Forum,Academician Wu Jinglian pointed out that over-investment has caused negative effects,the law of diminishing return on investment is fully apparent,and the system risk is hidden.China's listed companies also have generally over-investment behavior.On the basis of the existing research,the paper analyzes the effect of cash dividend payment on over-investment behavior,measures the level of corporate governance by principal component analysis,measures its regulation effect on the relationship between cash dividend and investment efficiency,and further tests the empirical analysis Private and state-owned listed companies in the suppression of the level of heterogeneity;through the impact of mechanism analysis,to study the role of cash dividend inhibition can play through the path.Three conclusions are drawn from empirical research: First,the cash dividend to ease the excessive investment is a certain inhibitory effect.The issuance of cash dividends is conducive to reducing the excessive investment behavior of listed companies,easing the agent and the owner of the agency conflict.Second,the improvement of supervision mechanism can strengthen the cash dividend on the excessive investment behavior of the inhibitory effect,but the overall sample,the incentive mechanism to improve the failure to form a similar supervision mechanism to strengthen the role.Heterogeneity results show that state-owned enterprises and private enterprise sample group in the role of the performance is not consistent.In the sample group of state-owned enterprises,the supervisory mechanism and the incentive mechanism all show the strengthening effect on the relationship between the cash dividend and the excessive investment inhibition,but there is no such significant relationship in the private enterprise sample group.Thirdly,the mechanism of cash dividends to curb excessive investment is through the impact of free cash flow.The issuance of cash dividends leads to a reduction in free cash flow,which in turn prevents the management from using excessive cash flow to invest excessively.Investment must be a degree,a reasonable investment structure in order to make the use of funds more efficient.The empirical results show that the cash dividend payment can inhibit the over-investment behavior,which also enriches the literature about the suppression of over-investment behavior,and this inhibition is more obvious in the good state-owned enterprise corporate governance mechanism.For state-owned enterprises,in order to curb cash flow over-investment behavior,the issuance of cash dividends is a way,and improve the corporate governance mechanism is also necessary.