Research On The Stickiness Of Executive Compensation Of Listed Companies In China's Banking Industry

The remuneration of the senior management of listed companies has been the concern of the community.In 2008,during the outbreak and spread of the global financial crisis,China Ping An broke the “senior executives pay” event,our government has issued 6 of executive compensation related financial industry restrictive policies and regulations during the January 2009-2010 year in March.Therefore,this paper chooses the research on the salary stickiness of the listed companies in China's banking industry,discusses the stickiness characteristics and influencing factors of executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies in the banking industry.This paper combines theoretical analysis with empirical analysis to study the pay viscosity of listed companies in banking industry.First of all,through the Guotaian database and the annual report of the banks,the paper analyzes the relevant data of listed companies in China's banking industry from the year of 2007 to 2015,and then discusses the present situation of executive compensation and bank performance of listed companies in China's banking industry.The salary of the listed companies has the following characteristics: the salary level leads to other industries,but the overall level is declining;the long-term incentive structure of the salary structure is insufficient;the executive compensation of the state-owned and non-state-regulateled banking listed companies is quite different;The executive compensation of listed companies is not exactly the same as the change of bank performance.Secondly,the empirical analysis is made on the existence and structural characteristics of executive pay viscosity of listed companies in the banking industry.The results show that there are sticky characteristics of executive compensation of listed companies in China's banking industry,and the performance of executive compensation performance will be increasing first and then decreasing.Furthermore,the author studies the impact of the proportion of independent directors,whether the same person as the bank governor and the chairman,the compensation regulate policy and the nature of the shares on the pay performance of the listed companies of the banking industry.Finally,some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to regulate the compensation stickiness of executives in China's banking industry.