Font Size: a A A

Research On The Impact Of Management Power On Executive Compensation And Compensation Performance Sensitivity

Posted on:2018-07-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330515991029Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the phenomenon of executives with high-pay and low-performance appears more and more,those "high-pay" which do not match the performance has been into the public eye.In the western countries,the management power has become an important basis for explaining the high payoffs from the principle of linking performance.In the context of our country's efforts to strengthen the relationship between executive compensation and performance,the theory of management power gradually gets our academic circles' attention.In this context,this thesis broadens the present thoughts,adding the theory of management power to supplement and deeply explores the changes in compensation performance sensitivity caused by management power.Based on the principal-agent theory,the optimal contract theory and the management power theory,this thesis chooses the listed company data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2015 as research sample,first tests the influence of the executive compensation on the impact of management power,and then tests the influence of compensation performance sensitivity on the impact of management power,at last,this thesis tests the company executive performance-compensation sticky problem.Through the study,it was found that management power is significantly positively correlated with executive compensation;management power reduces the compensation performance sensitivity;Executive compensation is positively related to profit performance and negatively related to loss performance.In order to carry out the research more deeply,this thesis further studies influences caused by management power under different property rights and different market competition environment.The result shows as below,management power management power is significantly positively correlated with executive compensation,management power reduces the compensation performance sensitivity,the management power of state-owned enterprises makes executive compensation pay attention to profitability and loss performance asymmetry significantly in state-owned listed companies.Management power management power is not correlated with executive compensation,management power reduces the compensation performance sensitivity,the asymmetric effect of state-owned enterprises is not obvious in nonstate-owned listed companies.Monopoly industry listed company management power management power is significantly positively correlated with executive compensation,management power reduces the executive compensation performance sensitivity,and executive compensation has a significant asymmetric response to profit performance and loss performance.In the competitive industry listed companies,management power management power is not significantly positively correlated with executive compensation,management power improve the executive compensation performance sensitivity,executive compensation on profit performance and loss performance response asymmetry effect is not obvious.Finally,based on the empirical results,this thesis summarizes the conclusions,and further puts forward some suggestions: designing scientific and efficient salary contract,perfecting internal governance mechanism and establishing sound external governance mechanism so that executive compensation of listed company can be exposed to sunlight.
Keywords/Search Tags:Management power, Executive compensation, Compensation performance sensitivity, Property rights, Market competition environment
PDF Full Text Request
Related items