A Study On The Impact Mechanism Of Corporate Control Transfer On Long-term Investment Returns

With the change of economic environment and policy system,C hina's control market has been developed rapidly.The transfer of control rights has become an important content in the control market.It has become an important means for rapid expansion,reallocation and diversification of enterprises.The development of the enterprise has brought a significa nt contribution.However,the transfer of control also led to the issue of control of contention.Control of competition will lead to serious internal friction,seriously affecting the normal production and operation of enterprises is not conducive to the development of enterprises.The transfer of control in the enterprise there have been two results,in order to explore the reasons behind the two results,this paper questions,control transfer in the end can create long-term investment returns for the enterprise? How does the transfer of control affect long-term investment returns? Through the theoretical research,evolutionary reasoning and empirical analysis,this paper uses the transfer of state-owned shares from 2006 to 2012 to explore the influence mechanism of the transfer of control rights on the long-term investment returns,and concluded that,after the transfer of control,the largest shareholder with high proportion of shares and the high degree of equity checks are not conducive to the performance of the long-term investment return;executive behavior in the situation is not conducive to the situation of the long-term investment returns' performance;central enterprises and private enterprises have greater power to get the long-term investment returns;The actual controller of the government in the long-term investment returns requirements obviously lack of motivation,the actual legal controller has the power to get the long-term investment returns.Secondly,through the univariate regression analysis and the multiple regression analysis,it is found that the overall effect of the system will change the effect of the single factor on the long-term investment returns in the newly formed internal governance system after the transfer of control.The system has weakened the role: the largest shareholder of the proportion of negative impact of weak;the nature of the incentive to weaken.The system has an enhanced effect: executives are abnormally replaced to highlight negative effects,and the government's actual controller has a negative impact ahead of schedule.Finally,this paper puts forward the proposal of improving the long-term investment returns in China's control.