Research On The Problem Of The Open-market Repurchase Of Chinese A-share Market

The open-market stock repurchase is typical trading activity types in the securities capital market.Due to the transaction characteristic referring to financial management,information disclosure supervision regulation,corporate governance and so on,therefore it has very important value of research.Since the Chinese securities capital market implemented legislation for repurchasing public stocks in 2005,open-market stock repurchase exists many questions,such as few of experience accumulated,lock of operation experience,deficient regime.Therefore,compared with a large number of open market share repurchase cases of developed countries Securities Market,there is still a big gap.The listed companies which implements repurchase shall be influenced by all interested parties,and it also would far-reaching influence all interested parties in financial and legal field.With the development of capital market,Chinese A-share investors shall face greater risk and more complex environment than before.Once Chinese open-market stock repurchase is gradually popularized or even explosive growth,it would bring many problems and maybe it is passive and late to research solutions at that time.Through widely searching,collecting and collating announcements of market information in the world,the author introduces a lot of cases of A-share market nearly ten years with literature analysis,case analysis,and comparative analysis.The author also analyses declaring motives and execution results of open-market stock repurchase with methods of quantitative analysis,qualitative analysis and data analysis.By the research,A-share open-market stock repurchase and cash bonus system is complementary.The supervision departments tend to influence companies' "organized territory" by making supervisory regulations,which shall lead to unfair situation.Therefore the author proposes moderate supervision supervisory policy to let open-market to choose stock repurchase or cash bonus.The author also proposes amending advice for improving hierarchy;promotes moderate supervision to make the open-market to predict and resolute the gaps;advises companies independent financial management to create foundation of institution for interest bodies.The author also finds that creditors of lists companies is fewer participation in and postposition of exercising rights in the open-market stock repurchase,which shall have negative effects on both sides and lead to repurchase deadlock.For that,the author analyses the focus of attention of stakeholders and proposes creditors of postposition of exercising rights which shall achieve win-win among stockholder,companies and creditors.The author makes a feasibility analysis for above.With analyzing the cases of A-share market stock repurchase nearly ten years,the author gains a number of basic information.The author proposes relative supervisory regulations advice in an innovative way offering theoretic support and practical reference for supervisors and shareholders.