The Research Of Underwriter Reputation Running Mechanism Based On The Sponsor's Credit Regulation Punishment

The implementation of the sponsor regime is an important reform to the system for initial public offering(IPO),The behavior of sponsors are related to the IPO companies,investors and the interests of every stakeholder.The behavior of sponsors are also related to the development of the long-term stability of the financial markets.We can say that the behavior of sponsors play the role of“A slight move in one part may affect the situation as a whole”.However,the sponsor system have put into effect for more than 10 years,although it has got a lot of praise,the language of concerned also appear.Some things continuously occurred in reality,such as “the wave of Everbright Securities”?“Wanfu Biotechnology Agricultural Development ”financial fraud and other Sponsors scandal frequently be exposed.Also it makes the recommender system become the focus of attention.Sponsors "collusion" and "commend not only protect" label will haul public attention back to look at the underwriter reputation and the efficiency of the CSRC securities regulation punishment.Under the constraint mechanism of CSRC securities regulation punishment,how to run the underwriter reputation mechanism and what are the consequences will bring on the behavior of sponsors?In this paper,the research idea is:First of all,explore the influence of the market share caused by The CSRC sponsor credit regulation punishment.The sponsors who punished by CSRC securities regulation punishment will drop their market share more than the sponsors who unpunished by CSRC securities regulation punishment after years.On this basis,consider the sponsor's efforts in business after the sponsor's efforts in business on them.Found that compared with the sponsor who are not subjected to the CSRC securities regulation punishment,the sponsor who are subjected to the CSRC securities regulation punishment will significantly reduce their IPO underpricing.Finally,we consider that sponsor who are subjected to the CSRC securities regulation punishment will work more carefully,the behavior to reduce their IPO underpricing will restore its market share and restore the damaged reputation consequently.We choose the sponsors and the IPO companies from 2005 to 2015 as research samples.We inspect the reputation recovery effort of the sponsors who unpunished by CSRC securities regulation punishment by comparing the degree of IPO underpricing.We find that the sponsors who punished by CSRC credit regulatory willwork more carefully and will reduce their IPO underpricing.This paper further test the dynamic mechanism of the sponsors who punished by CSRC credit regulatory will try their best to repair the damaged reputation efforts.We found that compare with the sponsor who are not subjected to the CSRC securities regulation punishment,the sponsor who are subjected to the CSRC securities regulation punishment will drop their market share significantly after years,However after make effort to restore the reputation,the market share will increase.Especially The efffect is more apparent for the larger sponsors.This paper be conducive to the improvement of the system of sponsors credit regulation and play an important role in regulating the behavior of sponsors.The research also can improve the efficiency of capital market and the healthy and stable operation of the financial market.