Research On The Collusion Of Private Audit In China Based On The Three Party Game

Independence is the essence of social audit,it is not only the most basic requirement of the certified public accountants' professional ethics,but also the important guarantee of the social audit and supervision power.The lack of independence,also means that the social audit authority.However,due to the absence of the actual situation of the audit client,the managers of the enterprises have become the actual clients of the audit activities,and form the condition of the audit managers themselves.Therefore,in recent years emerged Qiong Min yuan,Yinguangxia,Jinli Technology series of financial fraud cases,which makes the public have serious doubts about the independence of the audit.The lack of independence of the audit of our country's economic development has caused the harm that can not be estimated,but also serious damage to the social audit institutions in front of the public image.Therefore,only the first to solve the problem of audit independence,in order to ensure the long-term health development of social audit institutions.In view of this,this paper chooses the method of game analysis,discusses the problem of audit independence in our country.Firstly,the paper establishes the three party game model of government regulatory agencies,certified public accountants and enterprises.Then,the paper analyzes the influence of the change of audit independence.Secondly,through the analysis of the three party game equilibrium solution,and combined with the present situation of our country's social audit,from the three aspects of the regulatory agencies,registered accountants and enterprises,the reasons for the audit independence are analyzed.Finally,the paper puts forward policy recommendations to improve the independence of social audit in our country.