| Starting from the early planned economy,the government imposed more stringent controls on the salaries of state-owned enterprises.Since the reform and opening up,the reform of the market economy has been continuously promoted.In the process of reform of the state-owned enterprises,the remuneration system of the enterprises has also been adjusted.The government has relaxed the pay control for the senior management personnel of the state-owned enterprises in order to improve the enthusiasm of the state-owned enterprises.After the 2008 economic crisis,the financial industry,some of the senior executives of the high pay caused by the community's strong question and dissatisfaction.In the face of the pressure of public opinion,the Chinese government has actively introduced a series of policies to intervene to return to the remuneration control of the way to curb the high salary of the central enterprises executives,and thus narrow the gap between the internal salary of the central enterprises.Although the restrictions on executive compensation to a certain extent,the maintenance of social equity,narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor,but for the implementation of the economic consequences of policy implementation,some scholars that are not optimistic.In the past,most of the policy effects on pay control results show that even if the starting point of the government's implementation of pay control is good,the effect of policy implementation is often far from the original intention of the controller.In the field of pay control research,many scholars have found that the implementation of remuneration regulation will make the on-the-job consumption a remedy for state-owned enterprises to make up for cash remuneration.The existence of in-service consumption as a kind of implicit salary incentive is reasonable,but too much will increase the cost of agency,increase the profit of the management at the same time will infringe the shareholders' equity,thus reducing the validity of the compensation contract.The core of the principal-agent problem is that the top executives of the firm do not automatically maximize the interests of the shareholders.The best way to make the agent act in the interests of the client is to maximize the relationship between the agent's remuneration and the company's performance The However,in order to maximize the interests of executives,the ability to use the power of the hands of the pay contract to exert influence,through in-service consumption and other ways to obtain more personal recessive benefits,thereby reducing the monetary pay on the performance of the sensitivity.In order to further study the relationship between on-the-job consumption and monetary remuneration,it is necessary to further explore the following issues:first,excessive spending on the performance of the performance of the executive currency pay performance impact?Second,if there is to enhance or weaken the role?Finally,will this effect be different depending on the intensity of the pay control?In order to answer these questions,this paper takes the public data of 2011 and 2015 of the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the sample,combined with the institutional background of the remuneration control of state-owned enterprises in our country,and constructs the estimation model of over-consumption.Consumption of the sample on the excessive consumption of state-owned enterprises in the performance of the sensitivity of the performance of monetary remuneration of the regression test.Through the study,it is found that over-the-job consumption has a weakening effect on the performance sensitivity of executive compensation;the pay control is negatively correlated with the executive consumption level of the executive,the higher the salary control intensity,the higher the executive consumption level,And the weakening effect of performance sensitivity is more obvious. |
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