In recent years,people’s environmental awareness and national environmental regulations has become closed to perfect,increasingly companies begin to chase the economic profits,at the same time these enterprises start to pay more attention to establish their own social responsibility,manage the recycling of waste products and pay attention to the sustainable development mode of circular economy for companies.The closed-loop supply chain management makes the whole system to achieve a sustainable economic model,while maintaining economic growth and recycling,which is in line with the concept of circular economy.In the reverse recovery management of closed loop supply chain,the enterprise has to strengthen its own corporate social responsibility and improve its core competitiveness.In the closed-loop supply chain,each enterprise is independent decision-making,in order to achieve the maximum benefit of the closed-loop supply chain,it is necessary to gained the goal of the closed-loop supply chain through the cooperation of each company.Therefore,this paper studies the different enterprise responsible for recycling,influenced the recycling quality management level and recovery quality prevention level of each enterprise and the expected profit of the closed-loop supply chain,coordination through the design of quality incentive contracts to achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination.On the basis of previous studies,this paper from the angle of quality management,on the condition of asymmetric information,analyses the influence factors of recovery quality,establishes a principal-agent model and contrast of each node and the closed-loop supply chain‘s benefits,at last establish the quality incentive contracts to realize closed-loop quality control in recycling quality management.In this paper,maple18 is used to simulate the model data.The main research work and conclusions of this paper are:(1)when the seller take responsible to waste recycling,quality inspection level and quality prevention level are inverse ratio,while quality inspection level is proportional to the recovery factor;when the remanufacturers take responsible to waste recycling,quality inspection level and quality prevention level of factor factors and recovery levels are all inversely proportional to.(2)when the seller is responsible for recycling,it is better to choose the level of recycling to carry out the signal transmission than the choice of quality prevention level of signal transmission.(3)when the remanufacturer is responsible for recycling,after distributors taking quality control,which can promote the remanufacturer’s quality prevention level and improve the level of recycling,the closed-loop supply chain also has the optimal expected profits,then seller and manufacturer’s expected profit are both optimal.Compared with the domestic and foreign existing literature,the innovation of this paper are as follows:(1)this paper studies the problem of the closed-loop supply chain quality management under the condition of asymmetric information.In the existing quality management literature,the model is mainly about the premise of complete information,while considering the uncertainty of recycled quality parts,there are some limitations in practical application.The closed-loop supply chain quality management under asymmetric information is more practical.(2)in the study of waste electronic products recycling quality control,we include moral hazard in our study.In a recycling and remanufacturing process,this paper not only studies the remanufacturing products before manufactured have adverse selection of moral hazard problems,but also on the remanufacturing products have been manufactured,the remanufacturer has the moral hazard problem of hidden remanufacturing quality.(3)this paper introduces two quality effect factors to influence incentive mechanism.This paper analyzes the influence of recovery level factor and quality prevention level factor on the expected return of each company and the closed-loop supply chain. |