A Study On Split Share Structure Reform,Ownership Pyramid And Corporation Investment Efficiency

That the split share structure reform was an important institutionalization reform in the history of Chinese capital market,which aimed at eliminating the separation of tradable shares and non-tradable shares' institutional differences,"stock with different rights,with different price".As the reform basically completed by the end of 2006,Time has been across ten years,which is enough to make the research on the economic consequences of split share structure reform to be necessary and feasible.In order to enrich people's perception ahout the economic consequences of this reform,the article focuses on that the reform as the exogenous event has an impact on the ownership pyramid and investment efficiency of listed companies based on equity structure.The article combines the method of normative analysis and empirical analysis.Firstly finds and reviews the two types of agent problems and the relationship between investment efficiency,the split share structure reform and ownership pyramid.Secondly,it analysis the theoretical connotation about building a multi-level equity structure in deepth,explains the motivation on reducing the controlling shareholder to build a multi-level equity structure after the reform and the disadvantage of multi-level equity structure in investment efficiency,and constructs the theory architecture of ownership pyramid influencing corporation investment efficiency.And then,according to ultimate controllers' property rights,mining reasons about different changes of the ownership pyramid and the impact of corporate investment efficiency of the reform.Based on the theoretical analysis,the article has carried on the empirical research for listed companies in China after the reform to discovery the ownership pyramid changes and whose impacts on investment efficiency.The article selected 840 a-share listed companies from 2004 to 2015 at the Shanghai bourse and Shenzhen bourse,the data of control level,the separation of cash flow rights and control chain,equity balance degree and so on to reflect corporate equity structure,and draw lessons from Richardson investment model to measure the efficiency of investment company in order to study the economic consequences of the reform on ownership pyramid changes and its' effects on the investment efficiency.Conclusions are as follows.First,the reform has a significantly negative correlation with the companys' ownership pyramid.Showing that it relieves the agent conflict between controlling shareholders and other small shareholders,and weakens the motivation of controlling shareholders to build a multi-level structure.In other words,after the reform the companies ownership pyramid dropped significantly.Second,the complex agent relations of a multi-level equity structure and the long control chain weakened the supervision on managers contributed to reducing the transparency of control chain.Therefore,after the reform,fewer ownership pyramid is,higher investment efficiency is.Third,according to the ultimate controller type,samples could be divided into state-owned and non-state companies to analysis,which found that layers of equity structure may be helpful to reduce government intervention.As a result,the reform has a more significant influence on the investment efficiency of non-national companies.