Research On The Institutional Investors’ Behavior And Earnings Management Under The Cash Dividend Policy

At present,under the corporate governance system of the separation of two powers,it is difficult to completely eliminate the earnings management.Earnings management activities not only affect the normal production and operation of the enterprise in the future,and the accounting profit after earnings management whitewash will affect investors’ judgment for the real situation of the enterprise,misleading investors’ investment decision-making,disturbing the order of capital market operation.As an important participant in the capital market,institutional investors,with its professional investment analysis team and scale advantages,is considered to be sophisticated investors,can make more accurate judgments on the real earnings of the enterprise through analysing the financial report,identify enterprise’s earnings management activities,take negative behaviors,adjust the proportion of shares held of the enterprise.In the case of poor external audit supervision,with the increase in the shareholding proportion and shareholding time of institutional investors,to safeguard their own interests,institutional investors can supervise enterprise’ production and business operation activities,playing a role of corporate governance,and effectively inhibit enterprise’s earnings management activities become the focus of attention.Therefore,research on the relationship between institutional investor behavior and earnings management,is a test of whether institutional investors can effectively identify and inhibit the earnings management activities,it has great significance to evaluate the ability and function of institutional investors.Based on the theory of effective market hypothesis,information asymmetry theory,signal transfer theory and principal-agent theory,according to the hypothesis,selecting 2008-2015A-share listed companies with cash dividend as the research sample,using the change proportion of fund shareholding in the cash dividend announcement period to measure the investment behavior of institutional investors,constructing recursive structural model to verifying the relationship between institutional investors’ behavior and earnings management;Using the time of consecutive quarterly holding as standard to distinguish the steady institutional investors and the trading institutional investors,verifying the differences of the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors’ behavior and earnings management.At the same time,under the half compulsory cash dividend policy in china,research the influence of cash dividend level on the relationship between institutional investor’ behavior and earnings management.Theresearch results shows that: Institutional investors can recognize enterprise’ real earnings management,choose a enterprise who has a lower level of real earnings management to invest,trading institutional investors’ information recognition response ability is higher than steady institutional investors;Steady institutional investors can effectively curb the mode of sales manipulations and discretionary expenditure manipulation real earnings management,reducing the extent of sales manipulations and discretionary expenditure manipulation real earnings management;Cash dividends level can significantly weaken the institutional investors’ earnings management information recognition ability,at the same time can weaken steady institutional investors’ inhibitory effect of sales manipulations and discretionary expenditure manipulation real earnings management.Therefore,aiming at the problem of cash dividend level weaken the institutional investor’s identify ability and inhibitory effect of earnings management,we should gradually improve our semi mandatory cash dividend policy,encourage enterprises to carry out cash dividends return investors in accordance with the actual earnings condition;Considering the difference of the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors and earnings management,we should gradually develop institutional investors’ long-term investment consciousness,speeding up the construction of steady institutional investors,and better play the institutional investors’ role of supervision and management.