Study On The Interests Of Bank-guarantee In Small And Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Guarantee

The development of small and medium-sized enterprises in an increasingly has an important status and role in the national economy,but small and medium-sized enterprises are always small asset scale economy,and with asymmetric information and external risk prevention and the characteristics of the internal risk control mechanism is not sound and so on,these led directly to the cooperation difficulty between Banks and small and medium-sized enterprise.At the beginning of the 20 th century,our country gradually attaches great importance to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and actively explore ways to support the development of financial financing,and spare much effort to build a small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee system,in order to in the process of credit loan financing credit guarantee companies involved in the bridge of hope can be successfully established with Banks makes channels of small and medium-sized enterprise successful access to bank loans flowing smoothly.Based on this,this article hopes to solve the risk of cooperation between Banks and guarantee agencies guarantee reasonable allocation proportion help spread risk guarantee agencies,encourage the development of guarantee agencies and realize the sustainable development of our country small and medium-sized enterprise credit assurance.First from information economics perspective,this paper discuss the problem of asymmetric information in financial markets and caused by the adverse selection and moral hazard produced by,by building the model in this paper,the relationship between information asymmetry and credit rationing theory,explain how adverse selection and moral hazard in credit rationing,the analysis of existing in the theory of optimal assurance magnification and the optimal allocation proportion;Then try to establish cooperative Banks and small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee agencies both sides cooperation game model,the method of using Shapley value to reasonable risk allocation proportion,then for micro,small and medium enterprises credit guarantee loans financing system and to provide theoretical and practical support for sustainable development.Main contribution lies in: on the one hand,from the perspective of information economics analysis of the risk formation reasons,Banks and guarantee agencies should be set up Banks and guarantee agencies and put forward the internal and external coordination mechanism,to realize our country small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee risk of internal and external dispersed targets;Under the innovation point of view,on the other hand,using Shapley value analysis it is concluded that the risk of bank to cooperate with guarantee agencies share proportion,sustainability is put forward based on cooperative Banks and guarantee agencies under the way of cooperation.Will not only develop and perfect the small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee risk theory,and to promote our country small and medium-sized enterprises in the guarantee of credit assurance risk defense of practice ability,accelerate the process of the scientific development of China's small and medium-sized enterprise credit assurance,realize the sustainable development of our country small and medium-sized enterprise credit assurance,has very important theoretical guidance and practical significance.