Research On Management Incentive,R&D Investment And Firm Performance Of Listed Manufacturing Companies

The current world economic development has become a technological innovation and scientific and technological progress,in recent years,China's overall economic competitiveness and business strength is gradually increasing,but the innovation capacity is still weak,the enterprise as the main innovation,not yet fully effective R&D role The Especially for China's manufacturing enterprises,to increase R&D investment in the transformation and development of enterprises plays a vital role in the management as the backbone of the enterprise,affecting the intensity of corporate R&D investment,management incentives to improve the corporate governance structure Key,to achieve the convergence of shareholders and management interests,profit sharing,and R&D investment into high-risk high-yield,but also necessarily have a certain impact on business performance,then the management incentive and corporate performance was how the impact of the implementation of management incentives Will improve R&D investment intensity,R&D investment and how to affect business performance,regardless of this,R&D investment is connected to the management of incentive and performance of the bridge between the three in the end how the impact and what kind of relationship?At present,this study is based on the above issues,starting with R&D investment as an intermediary variable,to explore whether the management incentive through R&D investment impact on corporate performance.Choose 527 manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the object of study,using multiple regression and mediation effect analysis method,first studied the impact of R&D investment on enterprise performance,followed from the management of long-term equity incentive and short-term compensation This paper analyzes the relationship between management incentive and enterprise performance,and then analyzes the relationship between management incentive and R&D investment.Finally,on the basis of this,we introduce the research and development of intermediary variable R&D,further research and development investment in management incentive and enterprise Whether there is an intermediary between the performance of conduction effect.(1)The R&D investment of manufacturing listed companies is positively related to the performance of the listed companies,and the R&D investment effect is lagging behind.The lagging effect is the most obvious,but the R&D investment in the state-owned enterprises is the most important factor in the performance of the state-owned enterprises.(2)The management incentive and salary incentive are positively related to the performance of the firm,and in the state-owned enterprises,the performance of the non-state enterprise R&D investment is more significant than that of the state-(3)the implementation of the incentive plan for management to improve the proportion of R&D investment,for equity incentives,whether it is state-owned or whether the state-owned enterprises,Non-state-owned enterprises,the R&D investment intensity are not a straight line correlation,but was down "U"relationship,the impact of the existence of a critical point of 25%,when the shareholding ratio is less than the value,R&D investment strength with the increase in shareholding ratio If the value exceeds this,the R&D investment will be reduced,and the relationship between the two is more significant in the state-owned enterprises.For the salary incentive,there is a significant positive correlation with the R&D investment,indicating that the higher salary can improve the management Short-sighted behavior,increase the proportion of R&D investment,the incentive effect in the state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises in the gap is not obvious;(4)the introduction of R&D investment as an intermediary variable,the management of remuneration incentives have a positive impact on business performance,R&D investment plays a mediating role between management incentive and corporate performance,and there is no significant mediating effect between management equity incentive and performance.