A Comparative Study Of Two Equity Incentive Program In Vanke Group

Under the background of modeRN company system enterprises, equity incentive system gradually developed into one of the most effective way to solve the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers .Because of the variety of equity incentives,How to develop an effective equity incentive plan for the characteristics of the industry, the development stage and the policy environment of the enterprise is the concern of the enterprise. Shenzhen Vanke Co., Ltd. as the first batch of equity incentive to implement the listed companies,and continue to grow into China's largest real estate business, has been continuing to practice on equity incentive.Vanke successfully launched two equity incentive program, the first one in 2006 is the restrictive stock incenti-ve, the second is the 2011 stock option incentive. Since the results of the two schemes is not the same. For the first time because the indicators did not meet the pre-specified incenltive conditions and failed, the second time although the indicators are all achieved but did not avoid the emergence of a large number of executives left.we can see the implementation of equity incentive is a risk of failure,even if the successful implementation It may not be able to achieve the desired expectations, so how to design the details of the plan to achieve effective incentive effect is worth exploring.Based on the method of principal-agent theory, incentive theory and human capital theory,this paper makes a comparative study on the two cases of equity incentive scheme of Vanke Group by case study and comparative research. This paper analyzes the design and implementation of the two-way equity incentive program,influences the effect,and compares the two incentive processes from the aspects of incentive mode, fund source and assessment index, and tries to explore the two equity incentive schemes for Vanke Reasonable and available for reference, and finally for the program defects proposed some improvement measures. At the end of the article, it is concluded that the two equity incentive is reasonable for the Vanke,which is a well-designed equity incentive scheme and also plays a certain role in solving the principal-agent problem, but because of the external market, Crisis, the national macro-control and other uncontrollable factors, making the function of equity incentive has been limited. Second, the implementation of equity incentive and the stability of the external market and the effective operation of internal control has a close relationship.