Optimization Model Of Recycling Strategy Of Waste Household Appliances Under EPR

Recycling of waste household appliances has become a hot issue in the current society.In response,our country has issued a series of relevant policies to deal with.As a part of these,Extended Producer Responsibility System Implementation Plan,which is issued in December 2016,is clearly pointed out that the environmental responsibility of waste household appliances,from the production process to extend the life cycle of its products,must be borne by their manufacturers.In view of this facts that enterprises are the core of the recycling system of waste household appliances and part of them are cynicism,considering the EPR constraints,we study the choice of recycling channels and the design of the government’s incentive mechanism from the manufacturers view.Specific contents are as follows:Firstly,the trade-in recycling problem of waste products concentratedly decided by household appliance producers and retailers under the restriction of Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)was researched.We conduct trade-in recovery strategy optimization model with the goal of profit maximization based on the analysis of home appliance consumer marker structure,and establish the Stackelberg models of competition between government and enterprises in accordance with the characteristics of EPR system in China’s home appliance industry,and then study the firm’s old-for-new recovery pricing decisions at the time of maximum profit of the government subsidies and fund policy.And we compared the corresponding results with common unified-price scheme.The conclusions show that the effect of the maximum profit of the government subsidies and fund policy under the constraint of the EPR on the trade-in scheme on the sales,profit and recycling quantities depends on the cost structure,the composition of the consumers,the customer preference and its recovery processing capacity.Decision maker of firms should decide whether or not to launch a trade-in campaign in accordance with different scenarios.Secondly,making comprehensive consideration for the EPR constraints and coexistence of home appliance products direct sales and distribute sales model,we observed that the condition of home appliances manufacturing enterprises refinance end-of-life products spontaneously,which were recovered by retailers and second-hand appliances’ dealers.To solve the various members of the supply chain optimal pricing and profits,leader by the government decision model of supply chain was developed.And on the basis we analyzed how the amount of government subsidies and fund collection,new products and manufacturing cost margins,sales channel price differential sensitivity coefficient and recycling channel price differential crossprice sensitivity coefficient influence decision-making by various members of the supply chain.It proved that the higher government subsidies,the higher buy-back price of enterprise,the collection price and recycling amount of retailers and second-hand appliances’ dealers;the higher its processing on enterprise fund,the higher direct selling price,wholesale price and retail price;the more difference of new products and manufacturing costs,the better for enterprises to actively participate in recycling;it is troubling for retailers when consumers are more sensitive to price differences of sales channels;with the enhancement of consumer recycling channel cross-price sensitivity,it is disadvantageous to the profits of government,businesses and retailers,and more conductive to recovery by the second-hand appliances’ dealers.Thirdly,under the constraint of EPR,we study how to design the recycling subsidy incentive to promote the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in the recycling of waste products,and then increase the recycling of waste household appliances,when the household electrical appliance enterprises participate in the recycling.In response,we construct a twolevel programming model,which takes the government as the top policy maker and the producer as the lower level decision maker.The former makes a decision of recycling subsidies for manufacturers of waste household appliances,and then enterprises determine the number of waste recycling.The results show that the lower the cost of recycling processing,the higher the enthusiasm of participating in the recycling process.When the cost of recycling processing is strictly lower than the sum of government subsidies and their recovery benefits,production enterprises may recover all of its waste appliances;When the waste home appliance recycling market competition is intense,the government collects waste household appliances recycling fund and give their dismantling subsidies,in order to promote the recycling of production enterprises effectively;we need set up the corresponding recovery fund for different waste appliances to maximize the social welfare.