Executives Monetary Compensation,on-the-Job Consumption: An Empirical Study Of Influence On The Investment Efficiency

Investment decision plays an important role in business management.In modern enterprise system,the management right and ownership of the enterprise belong to different people,the essence of the business is executive personnel,executives have more business information than shareholders,for the reasons of self-interest,executives use information advantage to seek their own interests and damage shareholders.In the literature at home and abroad,most of the executive incentive research focuses on equity incentive.Because of the lag of information disclosure in China,the securities market mechanism is imperfect,the effectiveness of equity incentive is not.Therefore,it is necessary to use the monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption as an auxiliary incentive method of equity incentive.Since the 1980 s,has pay has become a hot issue in academia.At present,the system of the management compensation of listed companies in China is not perfect.The main research areas are the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance,and the impact of senior monetary compensation on investment efficiency is less.In recent years,the in-service consumption has been widely concerned by academia as another factor influencing the investment efficiency of enterprises.Some argue that executives undermine the company's interests while pursuing excess consumption.Others believe that,by expanding the size of the business,while increasing on-the-job consumption,the accumulation of contacts,access to more information,enabling executives to make more accurate investment decisions,will not hurt the interests of shareholders.Because of the state-owned background of many enterprises in China,administrative intervention makes the marketization of these enterprises is low.And the proportion of state-owned enterprises is large,it is necessary to distinguish the effect of two incentives under the nature of different equity.This paper selects a total of 665 samples of the listed companies in the three provinces of northeast China from 2011 to 2015.And it is divided into two groups of state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises to analyze the effectiveness of senior monetary compensation and in-service consumption in enterprises of different ownership characteristics.The results show that in state-owned enterprises,executive money compensation can inhibit inefficient investment,and in the Non-state enterprises,this inhibition is more obvious.But for in-service consumption in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises,the production of Fei efficiency.