Research On And Evaluation Of Equity Incentive Of Chinese Listed Company

It has been a big problem for many listed companies to build a rational and effective long-term incentive mechanism,before equity incentive becomes a mainstream approach of corporate governance.But the development of equity incentive in China is not as rapid as aboard,is there any deep reason? Whether state-owned background affect the result of equity incentive? Does equity incentive really contribute? These are problems worth thinking and researching.The majority of existing research mainly focus on empirical analysis rather than case analysis,which forms the core chapter of this paper.This paper chooses Shanghai Jiahua as the research object.After presenting a general principle of incentive contract design,this paper found irrational place in three places,1)the method of setting performance objective,this paper suggests introducing comparing objective which represents the level of industry,2)the choice of incentive mode,under current incentive mechanism,motivated object suffered a lot of cash flow,the motivated equity which has been granted are too dear to pay,this paper suggests introducing stock appreciation right or phantom stock to solve this problem,3)the expense of equity incentive disclosed in two files are different without any explanation,this manner is not according to book.In terms of the effect of equity incentive,the study uses the factor analysis to measure the long term profitability,meanwhile,investment and management shortsighted behavior also be introduced in the evaluation of equity incentive,from the results,both two terms of equity incentive has brought good results.