| The level of the firm's risk will affect their market competitiveness,and then it will lead to the differences in the level of business performance.The senior executives in the company are in the leadership position,who bear the submission and execution of the major decisions in the company on the survival and development.So the reasonableness of the managerial compensation structure will affect the level of market competitiveness.This paper is based on the effective sample data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A Share non-financial listed companies from 2009 to 2014,combined the principal-agent theory and prospect theory,and verified the impact of executive compensation to the corporate risk-taking.The research showed that:(1)The managerial monetary compensation and the risk-taking presented inverted U-shape;(2)When the managers' real monetary compensation is higher than expected monetary compensation,and the gap become greater,the enterprise risk-taking will become higher.When the managers' real monetary compensation is lower than expected monetary compensation,and the gap become greater,the enterprise risk-taking will become lower.(3)The managerial equity compensation and the risk-taking presented inverted U-shape;(4)The managerial compensation structure and the risk-taking presents positive correlation;(5)When the managers' real compensation structure is higher than expected compensation structure,and the gap become greater,the enterprise risk-taking will become higher.When the managers' real compensation structure is lower than expected compensation structure,and the gap become greater,the enterprise risk-taking will become lower.This paper apply the prospect theory to the study of the executive compensation incentive,which enriched the literature on the executive compensation?risk-taking and the prospect theory,also because of the limited scope of the prospect theory,so it will have a certain significance on the pioneered research of the prospect theory. |
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