Ultimate Control Power And Firm Value

Since the 90s of last century,the Theory of separation of two powers?Principal agent theory and other Corporate governance theory appeared one after another,People began to explore the mode of corporate governance gradually and triggered a global wave of reform in corporate governance.In recent years,small and medium-sized private enterprises become the main force to promote China's economic development,and modern corporate governance mechanism has been China's private small and medium enterprises short-term,private enterprise corporate governance in-depth study is urgent.and there have been a large number of scholars have studied the first type of agency problems,so this article is mainly concerned about the Second type of agency problems of private enterprises.In addition,in the corporate governance structure,the board of directors is always in the position of upload and release,through effective supervision and optimization of decision-making,it can complete the rational allocation of corporate resources,thereby increasing shareholder returns,improve corporate value,to achieve its "Maximize",the highest goal of work.It can be seen that the efficiency of the board of directors is of vital importance to the development of enterprises,especially the development of private enterprises,and to improve the independence of the board is especially important for reducing the agency problem between the major shareholders and small shareholders.However,the research on the regulation of the relationship between the independence of the board and the enterprise value is relatively few,most of them are focus on the relationship between the ownership structure and the board structure.Because the decisions made by the shareholders 'meeting are executed by the board of directors and the shareholders' meeting is controlled by the controlling shareholder,the independence of the board of directors has a moderating effect on the relationship between the ultimate control and the enterprise value.Therefore,this paper mainly studies this as the starting point.In addition,this paper also further studies the impact of heterogeneity on the research results.This paper first introduces the research background and research significance,summarizes the research literature of China and foreign countries,and summarizes several classic corporate governance theories.On this basis,we establish the relevant mathematical model,analyze the impact of the ultimate control on the value of the firm,and the moderating effect of board independence on them,and put forward the corresponding research hypothesis.Then we selected the Chinese new board companies in 2015-2016 as the research sample,the enterprise value is taken as the explanatory variable,the ultimate shareholder control proportion?the interaction items of the ultimate shareholder control proportion and the board characteristics are taken as the explanatory variables,separation degree of separation,enterprise scale,asset-liability ratio,equity balance and enterprise age are taken as control variables,which reflect the financial and governance characteristics of enterprises.An empirical model is established.Finally,through the descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis,regression analysis,the results are obtained,and the threshold model is used to analyze the impact of the enterprise heterogeneity on the results of the study by using the enterprise growth ability,corporate financing constraint and equity balance as the threshold variable respectively.The empirical results show that after controlling a series of variables that affect the value of the firm,the ultimate control of the enterprise can increase the short-term value of the enterprise which represents the interests of the shareholders,and will reduce the long-term value of enterprise—Tobin Q,which represents the integrated development of an enterprise.The higher the independence of the board is not conducive to improving the roe,but it is beneficial to improve the long-term value of Tobin q,indicating that the independence of the board of directors may alleviate the ultimate controlling shareholder's emptying behavior and benefit the long-term development of the enterprise.And business growth ability,financing constraints,equity heterogeneity will affect the previous study results.According to this,this paper argues that small and medium sized enterprises should combine the development situation of their own enterprises,their environment,choose the appropriate ownership structure,reasonably arrange the staff structure of the board of directors and managers so that the ownership structure and board independence are at a reasonable level.Only in this way can we ensure the legitimate rights and interests of small shareholders and long-term development of enterprises.Capital market regulators and government decision-making departments should formulate supporting laws,protect minority shareholders' interests reasonably,and promote the healthy stable and prosperous development of the small?medium sized enterprises and China's OTC market.