Research On The Relation Between The Multilevel Features Of Control Rights In Family Listed Company And Corporate Value

Family listed company is the earliest business form in the world,and it can easily be seen in today's world.From the generalized concept,in China,most private enterprises are family listed companies.Thousands of years of Chinese culture burned the mark of family-owned idealism to many Chinese social economic organizations.In recent years,the problem of fighting for control rights is more and more serious within inter-generational inheritance.Also,problems of allocating control rights and ownership occur during the process of inter-generational inheritance of Chinese family listed companies.Under such a circumstance,the author is interested in the problem of allocating the control rights led by companies' special governance structure in family listed company.This paper selects 891 family listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange as research objects,and mainly analyzes some features of family listed company.The features includes:the proportion of control rights,the final goal of control rights,family cohesion,the participation of family members in internal management and so on.Meanwhile,the paper adopts the theory of formal and informal corporate governance mechanism,analyzing the difference caused by the features to the corporate value.The paper found that the interval distribution of the proportion of family control rights has a nonlinear relationship with corporate value.That is "expropriation—alignment—entrenchment".More than ten percent of enterprises are in a serious entrenchment effect(tunneling effect)interval.The academia should pay attention to it and research it.The cash flow rights of family control rights has an obvious relationship with corporate value..However,the separation of control rights and cash flow rights has not a significant relationship with corporate value.The paper holds that if the proportion of cash flow rights is added,the family controlling stakeholders would pay more attention to the corporate performance and self-interests.The separation of two sorts of rights is just the surface reason of the stakeholder doing harm to the family corporate benefits.The deep reasons are——the conflict between families' benefits and the controlled companies' benefits,the security market lacks relevant supervisory system,leading to the situation more serious than before.There is an obvious relationship between family cohesion and corporate value.Family cohesion,weighing family members' cohesion and centripetal force of a family listed company,consistedof different positions in administration departments according to different consanguinity and the stock rights the family members owned.The result of empirical study shows that the higher the family cohesion is,the more valuable the corporate will be.How to improve the family cohesion and ease the internal conflicts within the family deserves researching deeply.There is an obvious relationship between the final goal of owned family control rights and corporate value.Among these,the corporate value is higher of family control rights for strategic purpose than for financial purpose.The participation of family internal management also has an obvious relationship with corporate value.The result of empirical study also shows that the corporate value is higher in a company if family members take part in business management than family members do not.The paper considers that the high participation of family internal management shows the family supervises and manages the listed companies' behavior and at the same time,it also releases the signal which can improve the confidence of external investors and warn the managers.At last,the author,from four aspects—family governance,the relation between shareholders and professional mangers,group governance of family companies and transnational governance,puts forward some suggestions on corporate governance.It is worth family listed company learning.Among them,I believe that with the continuous development of family-owned listed companies,family-owned enterprises should appropriately reduce the proportion of family members in the shareholdings in the enterprise and clarify the attribution of family property rights.Firmly establish the concept of "people-oriented" so that employees can really be cast Incentives to create a respected,harmonious,happy and enterprising group atmosphere,to stimulate employee enthusiasm,imagination and creativity;at the same time we must consider whether family entrepreneurs have the ability to continue to manage the enterprise,to delegate power or to continue to power Which has a strategic impact on the future direction of the enterprise;I also agree that the future development of the family-owned listed companies will generally form the trend of group governance.Among them,network governance and transnational.governance can not be ignored.Network governance should focus on the configuration of network control rights,the sharing of network resources and the coordination and interaction of network members.However,transnational governance must pay attention to the relationship between localization and control.It is necessary to prevent the out of control of the government,The development of foreign-funded multinational corporations in China's corporate governance transformation experience is worth learning from our family business.