Executive Background, Internal Control And Non-efficiency Investment

Investment as an important means of resource allocation,in the macro national economy and micro-enterprise development plays an important role.In the real economic activities,corporate investment decision-making limits by many factors,especially state-owned enterprises,Chinese state-owned enterprises not only need to perform economic functions,but also bear the corresponding social responsibility.In the past,the investment-driven growth model,the distortions of corporate investment incentives and the large-scale economic stimulus plan after the financial crisis in 2008 were easy to breed,such as "expansion impulses" and "inefficient investment",resulting in serious overcapacity.It is of strategic significance to solve the problem of overcapacity in China,but it can not solve the problem of inefficient investment in enterprises.In order to solve the problem from the root,we can only seek the method from the inside: the macro level,the state must change the mode of economic growth;Micro-level,companies need to change the investment,rational and efficient investment.In our country,the ownership structure of state-owned enterprises "dominance" and the "owner's absence" lead to serious insider control problems,so as to facilitate the opportunistic behavior of executives,resulting in the prevalence of "high investment inefficiency" Problem,the state-owned enterprises in China's economic development plays a leading role in the efficiency of investment issues to be resolved.In 2008,China's five ministries jointly issued the "Basic Standard for Internal Control in China".In 2010,the Guidelines on Internal Control of Enterprises were issued.All the listed companies disclosed the annual report of the Company in 2014 and disclosed the self-control of the Company's internal control Evaluation report and the financial report issued by the certified public accountant audit report.A series of guidance to the internal control of listed companies in our country have been issued,as well as the "thirteen five" plan to improve the internal control system,strengthen the implementation of internal control is one of the nine tasks of accounting development and reform,indicating that Chinese internal control Awareness is significantly strengthened,the role of internal control in corporate governance and development has been widely valued.Will the quality of internal control be significantly improved in the context of internal control and international convergence? Will high-quality internal control improve the inefficient behavior of state-owned enterprises?Management as the owner and creditors of the agents,the interests of both parties inconsistent circumstances can lead to agency conflict,managers usually follow their own wishes to operate the enterprise,but this is not always in line with the interests of shareholders.In addition,managers in the internal control of enterprises play a leading role in the background characteristics of executives in the design and implementation of internal control when there are differences.Some studies have shown that managers with different background characteristics have different psychological expectations and behavior choices,and they have different effects on corporate investment decisionmaking and performance.In general,the older managers and women than the male managers,ideas and behavior bias conservative,in the internal control design step by step,there will not be much innovation;the longer the manager of the enterprise and the more familiar with the design of internal internal control will be more targeted and efficient;The higher the qualifications of managers to consider the issue,more comprehensive,long-term vision,and more comprehensive design of internal control.In these cases,does the manager's background feature affect the relationship between internal control and inefficient investment?Based on the above problems,this paper studies the relationship between internal control and inefficient investment,and introduces the background characteristics of state-owned enterprises executives,analyzes the background characteristics of different executives on the relationship between internal control and inefficient in the regulatory effect,further analyze of this regulatory effect in the central enterprises and local stateowned enterprises of the differences.After the study,we get the following conclusions: Firstly,the internal control can significantly inhibit the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises,the inhibitory effect in the central enterprises and local stateowned enterprises are different;Secondly,with the growth of the average age of executives,internal control of inefficient investment is increase;Thirdly,the executive gender in the state-owned enterprises in the sample of the internal control and inefficient investment relationship between the regulatory effect,and further division of central enterprises and local state-owned enterprises in the local state-owned enterprises in the regulatory role is significant;Fourth,executives education on the internal control and lack of investment there is a regulatory role;Fifth,the average term of senior management can significantly affect the relationship between internal control and inefficient investment.In view of the theoretical analysis and empirical results of this paper,high-quality internal control can form a mechanism of mutual supervision and mutual restraint within the enterprise,but its role is limited,so the state-owned enterprises not should strengthen the internal control construction but should treat the governance effect rationally;Optimizing the composition of the management of the state-owned enterprises is an effective way to enhance corporate governance,state-owned enterprises should be reasonable arrangements,diversified team members of the composition of the enterprise's internal control and executive team composition for business stakeholders to provide a side of the investment decision-making reference In addition,state-owned enterprises should conscientiously implement the mixed ownership reform and avoid the drawbacks of the ownership structure of the stateowned enterprises the implement the diversified incentive and supervision mechanism to expand the incentive and supervision object and not only the executives.The government should also limit the state-owned enterprises investment boundary and improve the state-owned enterprises investment errors accountability mechanism.Accordingly,this article for the new round of state-owned enterprise reform to provide some inspiration,but also for the inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises another way.