Research On Cooperative R&D Strategy Of Platform Enterprise Based On Bilateral Market Theory

Cooperative R&D theory is an important field of modern industrial organization research.In recent years,with the rapid development of social economy,competition between enterprises increasingly fierce,product and technology update is very fast,therefore,in the fierce competition in the enterprise,technological innovation is becoming increasingly important.However,the development of new technologies is faced with many problems,such as large amount of capital investment,long investment cycle,full of uncertainty,and other factors to promote cooperative research and development has gradually become the mainstream of modern economic development.Because enterprises choose cooperative research and development,not only can realize the sharing of resources,talent and technology,reduce the cost of technology research and development,improve the efficiency of R&D,but also to avoid excessive R&D competition caused by repeated innovation and waste of resources.The traditional cooperative research and development theory only studied the problem of cooperative research and development in unilateral market,but with the development of the times,many platform enterprises with bilateral market attributes emerged,such as electronic trading platform and bank card payment system.The use of unilateral market research and development theory to study the bilateral market will have some limitations.Therefore,based on the model of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin(1988),this paper introduces the cross-network externality and constructs a new two-stage game model to analyze the problems of platform cooperation in bilateral market.The main contents of this paper are divided into six parts:The first chapter puts forward the research background and significance,the research ideas and methods,the possible innovations and shortcomings of the paper;Chapter 2 first defines the technical spillovers and cross-network externality The third chapter constructs the basic model of the cross-network externality equal to zero;the fourth chapter constructs the general model of the cross-network externality greater than zero;the fifth is the general model of the cross-network externality equal to zero;Chapter theory and practice,combined with the typical case of platform enterprises,with the model derived from the theoretical results of the case of the platform to explain the behavior of enterprises;Chapter 6 summarizes the previous research conclusions and puts forward the research prospect.Through research,this paper draws five conclusions.Conclusion 1:In the general bilateral market where the cross-network externality a is greater than zero,if the technology spillover ? is greater than its critical value,that is ?>? = 1/(2-?),the technical spillover threshold,higher than the two platform companies alone research and development efficiency.Conclusion 2:In the general bilateral market where the cross-network externality is greater than zero,when the cross-network externality a is high,the technical spillover ? is high enough to ensure that the level of cooperative research and development of platform enterprises is higher than that of independent research and development.Conclusion 3:In the general bilateral market where the externality of the crossover network is greater than zero,we find that(?)xiNC/(?)?<0 and(?)xiC/(?)?>0.That is the efficiency of independent research and development of platform enterprises decreases with the increase of technology spillovers,and the efficiency of cooperative research and development is the same as that of technology Overflow increases and increases.Conclusion 4:In the general bilateral market where the externality of the crossover network is greater than zero,the technological spillovers of any size,we find that(?)xiNC/(?)?>0 and(?)xiC/(?)?<0.That is,regardless of the choice of platform companies to develop research and development or research and development alone,its research and development efficiency or are on the cross-network increase in external alpha increases.Conclusion 5:If the cross-network externality is low ?<0.21,cooperation improves social welfare,compared to no-cooperation,if and only if ?>1/(2-?).If the cross-externalities are so high that the cooperation between the platform firms can also increase the increase in social welfare if and only if the technology spillovers close to 1 or approaches 0.