High Premium M&A Of Listed Companies:For Synergistic Effect Or Tunneling Controlling

In the background of economic transformation and overcapacity,mergers and acquisitions market has presented the exceptionally irritable aspect in recent years.The merger trend characterized by high premium,high performance commitment has become the norm.Whether in traditional industries or the Internet industry,more and more companies are aware of the importance of relying on mergers and acquisitions to help companies implement the strategic transformation and upgrading.If it is truly based on the development of enterprises,in order to enhance the competitive advantage of enterprises and in order to bring real benefits to shareholders,the acquisitions with high premium are not bad.But behind the high premium M&A,major shareholders may change merger performance commitments optionally.The crazy acquisitions may lead to the devaluation of goodwill,even possibly transfer benefits to large shareholders and other stakeholders.Whether high premium M&A of the listed companies is one of the reasons leading to the failure of M&A?Whether high premium M&A can achieve the expected synergistic effect or will damage the interests of minority shareholders?These research topics of the academia have not given the exact answer.This paper adopts the method of case study in part make up for the lack of the case study of high premium M&A.It also verifies the empirical research.This paper mainly analyzes the motivation of high premium M&A from two aspects:achieving the expected synergistic effect or tunneling controlling.The analysis of in order to achieve the expected synergistic effect focus on whether high premium M&A of the listed companies has achieved management synergy,operating synergy and financial synergy.The analysis of in order for tunneling controlling focus on the acquisition target,transaction price and transaction time and the influence on the interests of minority shareholders.We hope that we can make reference and suggestions for the supervision department and minority shareholders to deal with the high premium M&A through the acquisition of Yutong Bus case.This study shows that high premium M&A in Yutong bus case may be a tunneling behavior of the major shareholder under the control of Yutong group transferring benefits.High premium M&A may not necessarily improve the company's financial performance and market performance.It is easy to become a tool for major shareholder transferring interests.In view of the high premium M&A behavior of the capital market,we should establish a more reasonable ownership structure,improve the market supervision mechanism,strictly enforce the information disclosure system and strengthen the law to protect outside investors.