The Research Of Independent Directors Proportion,CEO Tenure And Investment Crowding In Long-term Assets

In a current mature enterprise system,corporate executives,especially the CEO has a high status,firmly grasp the enterprise resource allocation and development strategy.It is the core of the entire business operation.Principal-agent problem still is the key issue to maximize enterprise value.Academic research executive for background characteristics,the investment has been regarded as the most important issue.In reality,the investment decisions of CEO are often based on their own interests,which led to the non-efficiency of business investment.CEO of both tenure and the expected term investment decisions that directly affect their motivation may occur in extreme cases a lot of strife investment crowding,making investment allocation is very unreasonable.Long-term assets in the enterprise occupies a very important position,but not a huge amount to the financial statements have a significant impact,so we should take the investment crowding in long-term assets problem more seriously.The independent director system to alleviate the agency problem,reduce agency costs,effectively prevent the use of information asymmetry management principles to get more benefits.Therefore,this paper attempts under agency theory analysis framework,using upper echelons theory reveals CEO tenure and long-term asset investment crowding relationship and examine mitigation proportion of independent directors on a voluntary settings.In this paper,firstly,we talk about the background of the research,and then we sort out the related domestic and foreign literatures.After the normative analysis of the combination theory,this paper examines the influence of CEOs' tenure and expected tenure on the long-term asset investment in China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2015,and then studies the proportion of independent directors.Capital investment to the influence of squeeze,and through the nature of property rights will be divided into two types of state-owned and non-state-owned samples were examined,while comparing the empirical results of the two,summed up the conclusions of this paper.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the CEOs' tenure and long-term asset investment and the negative correlation between the CEO's expected tenure and long-term asset investment.In addition,the proportion of high independent directors can The long-term assets of different CEOs of the long-term investment to play a more significant role in mitigation;the CEO of both the term,the proportion of non-state-owned enterprises of high independent directors mitigation for long-term asset investment mitigation significantly greater,and stateOf the mitigation effect is not obvious.These conclusions are of great significance to explore various types of long-term asset investment behavior and its motive,perfect enterprise human resource management and promote reasonable investment allocation.