A Study On The Correlation Between Self-interest Of Management,Corporate Goverance And Cost Stickiness

Since the concept of "cost stickiness" was first proposed by Anderson in 2003,cost stickiness has been one of the most popular problems in foreign accounting research,which reveals the asymmetry between cost change and business volume change.At present,the more mainstream explanation is the opportunistic view,which is that the manager's self-interest is the input of the enterprise's resources,which keeps the cost sticky at a high level.Corporate governance,as an important way of restraining managers' self-interest,will exert a significant inhibitory effect on cost stickiness.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the effect of corporate governance on cost stickiness in cost management.This paper starts with the theory of agency,explores the theoretical motivations of the free cash flow inducing management self-interest behavior and then promotes the cost stickiness,and then analyzes the mitigation effect of corporate governance on the agency problem and the influence on the cost stickiness.Finally,on the basis of the theoretical analysis,this paper selects the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as research samples,adopts the empirical analysis and comparative analysis of the research methods,the following three questions for the empirical test: the existence of cost stickiness,the influence of free cash flow on cost stickiness,and the effect of corporate governance on cost stickiness at different free cash flow levels.The results show that the listed companies in China do have the characteristics of cost stickiness,while the free cash flow strengthens the self-interest motive of the management,and has a positive effect on the stickiness of the cost.And when the free cash flow is abundant,good corporate governance has a more pronounced inhibitory effect on cost stickiness.