Ownership Structure,Auditing Quality And Overinvestment

Investment activities are curtailed due to the association with not only value,benefits and development and but also a relation related to the risk of financial operations.Under current market environment,however,most of our enterprises are underdeveloped or over-investment,which may negatively affect the operation of the whole macroeconomic.The main reasons for the inefficient investment are mainly related to the lack of relevant laws,irrational ownership structure,inadequate capital market and distorted accounting information.The process of economic development in our country,the ownership structure of listed companies is the dominance of the situation,the high concentration of equity,and equity are mostly concentrated in the hands of the government and the country,which makes the enterprise internal management and major shareholders to form the principal-agent relationship,because management is not a real shareholder,easily in the self-interest behavior of non efficiency investment trend.Therefore,the internal governance structure of the listed companies is very likely to cause an important reason for the low investment efficiency of the enterprises.At the same time,the quality of external audit,as part of the external governance mechanism of the corporate governance structure,has a certain influence on the investment efficiency of the listed companies.The main research questions are:the impact of ownership concentration on overinvestment and their relationship;the impact and impact of equity checks and balances on overinvestment;how ownership structure and auditing quality can affect overinvestment together.This paper aims to study how the ownership structure and audit quality affect and lead to overinvestment.Underpinned the theories of principal-agent,information asymmetry and the theory of separation of powers,this paper collects studies the sample data of 2008 and 2015 of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in whichshareholding degree,equity balance and equity Audit quality are defined as independent variables.Three models are constructed and used for the calculation and regression analysis to test the relationship between the three and over-investment,and domestic and foreign related theories in-depth study and selective reference,combined with China's institutional background.The study shows that ownership structure could leads to the over investment in the listed companies in our country.The ownership concentration and the over-investment have the opposite relation.The equity balance has certain inhibitory effect on the over-investment,and the effect is that when the listed company.Higher the quality of audit,the lower the possibility of over-investment;when the listed company for the case of state-owned enterprises,the ownership structure and the audit quality of the interaction between the state-owned enterprises,the more the quality of the audit,the listed companies' over-investment situation has an inhibitory effect.Finally,valuable implications and suggestions are also given out for the relevant practitioners and policy maker and management.Also,future research is put forward.