Research On The Influence Of The Managerial Ownership Of The Listed Companies On The Dynamic Adjustment Of Capital Structure

In 2006,?A trial approach to the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned listed companies(domestic)?was brought up,and the equity incentive was formally implemented in China.Managerial ownership is a governance tool which solve the principal agent problem and has always been the focus area at home and abroad.However,the effect of managerial ownership is different.Some scholars believe that managerial ownership can play the convergence of interest effect,the personal interests of executives are combined with the overall interests of the enterprise;some scholars believe that managerial ownership will produce entrenchment effect,executives will make short-term behavior which is not conducive to the maximization of enterprise value.Based on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure,this paper examines the effect of managerial ownership.In this paper,a partial adjustment model of capital structure is established based on previous studies,and the target capital structure of enterprises is estimated through regression,the deviation degree of capital structure is calculated,and the speed of capital structure adjustment is estimated.Based on the capital structure adjustment model this paper do fixed effects regression,from the perspective of static and dynamic perspective respectively,to test the relation of China's listed company managerial ownership and capital structure adjustment.This paper also distinguishes the level of debt,the level of ownership and the nature of property rights,and makes a thorough study of the groups.This paper found that there is a certain degree of deviation of Chinese listed companies between its capital structure and target capital structure has a,and because of China's capital market information disclosure is not perfect and the internal supervision is not perfect,China's managerial ownership mainly performs entrenchment effect,high managerial ownership inhibited the adjustment of capital structure.Due to the financing constraints of China's state-owned enterprises,the inhibitory effect of managerial ownership is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises.Because of the high level of financial risk in the over-indebted enterprise,the managerial ownership will produce the convergence of interest effect and promote the adjustment of the capital structure.This promotion effect is also verified in the low proportion of executives.With the increase of managerial ownership ratio,entrenchment effect gradually takes the place of convergence of interest effect.The group research on managerial ownership level enriches managerial ownership researches.Combining convergence of interest effect and entrenchment effect,it provides a new perspective for the dynamic adjustment of capital structure.This paper provides a certain theoretical support for the determination of the reasonable level of managerial ownership and the incentive effect of executive managerial ownership.