Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation Self-interest To Governance Of Debt Financing

With the attention concerned by the public opinion to the "high-price compensation" of senior executives,the academic community has conducted a series of studies on the rationality of executive compensation.From the perspective of principal-agent theory,executive compensation acquisition is not only the normal agency cost payment in the principal-agent relationship,but also the incentive for executives to carry out effective and continuous operations.However,from the perspective of the allocation of decision-making power,executives will use the decision-making power under corporate control and ownership separation to influence the design of the remuneration system to obtain excess remuneration.At the same time,because the issue of "manufacturing 2025" and the existence of overcapacity,the issue of financing constraints in China's manufacturing industry has become increasingly prominent,and the debt financing behavior of enterprises has been greatly restricted under overcapacity and creditor supervision,and manufacturing has been effective.The debt financing governance is imperative.Then,can executives who are motivated by compensation in the entrusted agency relationship implement effective debt financing governance when companies are subject to financing constraints?Does multiple forms of self-interest in compensation hurt corporate governance and corporate value?This series of questions needs to be tested by theoretical analysis and empirical research.Although relevant research shows that executive compensation incentives can improve corporate value and optimize the governance structure of debt financing,but after elaborating self-interest behavior of executive compensation,can excessive self-interest be beneficial to corporate value incentives?Based on this point of view,this paper summarizes excessive executive pay compensation as executive self-interest behavior,and represents senior management self-interest behavior from three perspectives:executive-employee pay gap,excess pay,and excess on-duty consumption.Analyze and test the effect of executive compensation self-interest on corporate debt financing ability and debt financing term structure governance effects,and the economic consequences of executive compensation self-interest and the relationship path of executive compensation self-interest,debt financing governance and corporate value.The specific content is as follows:First,starting from the executive compensation self-interest and the governance of debt financing,under the division of the nature of property rights,then examined the corporate value incentive effect of pay gaps among executives and employees,excess remuneration,excessive on-duty consumption,debt financing capacity and debt maturity structure in the state-owned and non-state-owned manufacturing industries.It is found that the pay gap,debt financing capacity and long-term debt will all stimulate the growth of the company's value.Except for being able to encourage corporate value in non-state-owned enterprises,over-remuneration will inhibit the growth of the company's value,excess remuneration and excess on-duty consumption will stimulate the growth of the company's value.Secondly,it deeply studies the effect of self-interest on the governance effects of debt financing,and in turn examines the effects of salary gap,excess remuneration and excess on-duty consumption on debt financing capacity and debt maturity structure governance effects.Finding an appropriate executive-employee compensation gap does not negatively impact the positive governance effects of debt financing capacity and debt maturity structure.Excessive compensation and excess on-duty consumption will negatively weaken corporate positive debt financing governance effects.Finally,this paper explores the path of executive compensation self-interest affecting the company's value,and studies the relationship between executive self-interest,debt financing governance and corporate value,and finds the negative economic effects of self-interested executive compensation.It is passed through the intermediary of the level of debt financing governance.Based on the above research contents,the possible innovations in this paper are:First,the specific performance of the self-interested behavior of executives is clearly defined.In this paper,the self-interest of executive compensation is subdivided into explicit salary gap,excess salary,and implicit excess on-duty consumption.The effect of the executive self-interest behavior is compared with the comparative test under the property group nature.Second,for the first time,it systematically analyzes the effect of executive self-interest on governance effects of debt financing.On the basis of existing research,the effectiveness of debt financing capacity and term structure and the negative effects of self-interested executive compensation on debt financing governance were further examined,providing a mean for the supervision of self-interested executive compensation.Third,it clarified the part of the transfer path of self-benefiting executives' influence on corporate value.In the examination of the intermediary effects of self-benefiting salary,debt financing governance and enterprise value,executive self-benefiting suppression on corporate value is passed through its way of reducing the level of debt financing governance.