Analyst Attention,Earnings Management And Corporate Investment Efficiency

Investment decision-making is one of the three financial decisions of an enterprise.According to the tax-free MM theory,investment activity is the most important factor affecting the enterprise value.However,in actual operation,the investment decision-making is affected by many factors,so that enterprises may not be able to make the optimal investment decisions,leading to inefficient investment,inefficient investment will further reduce the enterprise value,hinder the realization of shareholder wealth maximization,therefore,it is of great practical significance to study how to improve the efficiency of corporate investment.With the vigorous development of China's capital market,the securities analyst industry came into being.They mainly played two functions of information intermediary and external supervision in the capital market.As an information intermediary,they collect the relevant information of listed companies and to interpret,mitigate the information asymmetry between the investors and the listed companies;as the external supervisor,they make the opportunistic behavior of the management more easily exposed,prompting the management to make more rational decisions,alleviate the agency problem.After analysis,we find that through the functions of information intermediary and external supervision,analysts can promote the investment efficiency of listed companies.On this basis,this article further explores the concrete path of analysts influencing investment efficiency and finds that the role of analysts in supervising listed companies in high-quality accounting information disclosure is an important transmission mechanism that affects the investment efficiency.So this thesis takes the degree of earnings management as a measure of the quality of accounting information,Integrating analysts' attention,accounting information quality and investment efficiency into a systematic research framework to explore the concrete path for analysts to affect investment efficiency.This thesis is composed of six parts: the first part is the introduction,which introduces the research background,significance,methods,content and possible innovation points of this paper.the second part is literature review,introduces the related research,grasp the research status,expounds the starting point of this study;the third part is the theoretical analysis and assumptions,based on the information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and efficient market hypothesis as the theoretical basis,deduced the hypothesis of this study;the fourth part is the research design,introduces the sample,variables and models;the fifth part is the empirical results and analysis,including descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis,regression analysis and robustness test;the sixth part is the conclusion and Enlightenment of this thesis.This study finds that the work of our country's analysts can improve the investment efficiency of listed companies and restrain the earnings management behavior of listed companies,and the restraint effect of analysts on earnings management behavior is an important transmission mechanism to promote the investment efficiency of listed companies,That is,the analyst first restrains the earnings management behavior,makes the listed company disclose higher quality accounting information,the high quality accounting information further promotes the investment efficiency improvement.The result of this paper is conducive to correctly understanding the role of analysts in the capital market,strengthening the construction of the external corporate governance mechanism and further improving the investment efficiency of listed companies.