| For a long time,the compensation of the listed companies is a controversial topic,both in the practical and academic circles.Effective compensation incentive system is the basis for effective management of enterprises,but it is not the good result of the salary incentive mechanism that the "high salary" and the disparity in salary gap are often exposed in the state-owned enterprises.In 2004,2009 and 2014,the government issued relevant salary management system to restrict and limit the salary of employees of state-owned enterprises in order to effectively curb the occurrence of unreasonable remuneration.The "salary limit order" promulgated in 2009 has limited the two aspects of the remuneration of executives of state-owned enterprises and the high pay gap between executives and employees.This policy has both advantages and disadvantages,and that can reduce the salary gap,reflect social justice,consolidate the social foundation to ensure its steady development,at the same time,but also to the long-term performance of enterprises and bring security;the disadvantages that will affect the enthusiasm of enterprise executives,which hold negative attitude in a short period of time then,the effects of short-term benefits of enterprises.Therefore,this paper will try to investigate the influence of the internal compensation gap and the external compensation gap of the state-owned enterprise executives on the enterprise performance,and examine the regulatory role of government management.This article mainly includes five parts.The first part is the introduction.First of all,the background and significance of the paper are clarifying.Then,the related literature at home and abroad is reviewed.Finally,the research ideas,main research methods and innovation points are summarized.The second part is the definition and theoretical basis of related concepts.This part defines the related concepts of the research object,and expounds the principal-agent theory,the optimal compensation contract theory,tournament theory and social comparison theory.The third part is the hypothesis of theoretical analysis and research.First of all,we review the institutional background of Salary Regulation in state-owned enterprises,and then analyze the mechanism of government regulation and control on the relationship between executive pay gap and business performance,and put forward hypotheses based on this.The fourth part is an empirical study.The executive compensation gap of all A share listed state-owned companies in the past 2006-2016 years is selected as the research sample,and the influence of government control on the relationship between executive pay gap and corporate performance is empirically tested.The fifth chapter,research conclusions and policy recommendations.The findings are as follows:(1)the gap between top managers and employees and the external gap of executive pay has a positive effect on corporate performance;(2)government regulation has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between executive pay gap and corporate performance.The research shows that under the background of the government's salary control,the state-owned enterprises should work out a reasonable salary level and set the appropriate salary gap,so as to give full play to the incentive mechanism of executive compensation.The possible innovation is:(1)the current research on the executive pay gap in academic circles mostly concentrated on the internal gap,and for the executive compensation gap between the external relatively less attention,in this paper the effects of executive compensation-employee gap on enterprise performance was also investigated in the influence of executives of state-owned enterprises the external compensation gap on performance;(2)this paper examines the impact of changes in the September 16,2009 "salary limit order" and the state executive pay gap-internal staff and external executive pay gap on the performance of the enterprise,in order to verify whether the government control can play an effective role. |
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