Research On Anti-hostile Takeover Of Listed Companies

With the deepening of the equity division reform,the non-tradable shares of the A-share market that could not have been traded on the stock market are decreasing,and the proportion of shares outstanding is increasing.This means simplifying the process of corporate acquisition to achieve the goal of buying stocks from the secondary market to acquire the target company.At the same time,with the development of the capital market securities market,financial instruments have been continuously innovating and social capital has been continuously accumulating,which has provided convenience for the acquirer to obtain sufficient acquisition funds.As a result,the number of acquisitions in China has been increasing.At the same time,anti-takeovers have become more frequent,and there has been no hostile takeover.A hostile takeover is a case where the target company is forcibly taken over without reaching an agreement with the management,and often the target company will fight back and fight.Therefore,the fierce confrontation between the two sides is the characteristic of malicious acquisition.The dispute over the equity stake in Vanke Power,which began in 2017,is in the category of hostile takeovers.When hostile takeovers take place more frequently in the market,and for China's listed companies,a systematic anti-takeover system has not yet formed.Therefore,how to carry out anti-takeovers is an urgent issue to be solved.This article makes a systematic study of the issues related to hostile takeovers and anti-takeovers from both theoretical and practical perspectives.Based on the research thinking,this article is divided into five parts for writing.The first part is the introduction part,which mainly introduces the research background,research purpose,ideas and methods as well as research innovation points.The second part is the theoretical foundation and literature review of this article.First of all,it elaborates on the relevant theories of company acquisition.Secondly,we reviewed the domestic and foreign literature on corporate acquisitions in recent years.The third part analyzes the evolution path of the acquisition behavior of listed companies by establishing the evolutionary game model of both parties,and analyzes two evolutionary stability strategies.The fourth part is the case analysis section,which first elaborates the development process of the case and focuses on the analysis of Vanke's anti-takeover strategy.Through a detailed analysis of the case,a summary of the case is finally made,and the deficiencies and advantages of China Vanke's anti-hostile takeover are refined.The fifth part belongs to the conclusion of the research.First of all,it summarizes the whole thesis,and then builds an anti-takeover defense system based on the whole study and proposes related anti-malicious acquisition related legislation and supervision.