Study Of The Maintenance Of Common Resource Based On Reporting And Monitoring

Ensuring sustainable use of ecological,social,and technological resources has became a global problem,and it is urgent to be studied.Institutional management,as a mean of solving these social problems,has played an important role in the maintenance of cooperation and common resource.In particular,many mechanisms of institutional management have been proposed to promote the evolution of cooperation efficients,such as punishment,reward,and exclusion.However,the reporting and monitoring mechanisms,as a common mean of institutional management,are rarely studied from the theoretical perspective.And in theory it is unclear how the reporting and monitoring mechanisms affect the sustainability of cooperation and common resource.Therefore,this thesis mainly focuses on problems regarding the maintenance of cooperation and common resource in infinite,finite,and structured populations,containing the following contents:First,we introduce the reporting and monitoring mechanisms into the public goods game in infinite and finite well-mixed populations respectively,and try to study the role of this mechanism in the evolution of cooperation.Here,cooperators report defectors with a certain probability.In parallel,the monitoring institution also monitors defectors with a certain probability.The results demonstrate that the introduction of reporting and monitoring mechanisms is indeed effective: the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game,thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations.Meanwhile,reporting intensity has nonlinear effects on cooperative behaviour under the weak punishment intensity,and intermediate reporting intensity is relatively more effective in maintaining cooperation.In addition,group size also has complex nonlinear effects on cooperation when the fine is relatively large.Then,we investigate the roles of the reporting and monitoring mechanisms based on collective-risk social dilemma game in structure populations.In our minimal model cooperators report defection according to the loss of their interests.In parallel we assume a monitoring institution that monitors all group members and identifies wrong behaviour with a certain probability.A sanctioning institution accordingly develops punishment schemes by imposing a fine on related defectors with considering thesefeedbacks.The results highlight that reporting mechanism plays a more significant role in maintaining high cooperation level which is unprocurable in environment of high synergistic effects.Simultaneously,when the synergistic effects are high,only enough monitoring pressure can ensure high level of cooperation,while reporting is not effective in this case.In addition,we can observe a phase transition leading to an outbreak sustainability for the macro regulation about monitoring probability and decision propensity for the shake of well-being.Finally,we study the impacts of the reporting and monitoring mechanisms on the evolution of cooperation in the environment of resource allocation.We investigate the effects of resource allocation on cooperation and common resource in the public goods game.The results show that basic demand has nonlinear effects on cooperative behaviour under the intermediate reward intensity,and intermediate level of basic demand has relatively negative impact on cooperation.Meanwhile,reward intensity also has nonlinear effects on the amount of common resources,and intermediate reward intensity leads to the most effective accumulation of common resource.Furthermore,the most effective scheme of resource allocation for the maintenance of cooperation and resource is low level of basic demand and intermediate reward intensity.Besides,the resource allocation is totally inefficient for promoting the evolution of cooperation when the synergistic effects are relatively low.Thus,the introduction of the reporting and monitoring mechanisms can not only solve the social dilemma in this case,but also enable the resource allocation to restore its role in the maintenance of cooperation and common resource.In particular,intermediate reward intensity and low level of basic demand provide an optimal environment,in which the mechanisms of reporting and monitoring plays the most effective role in maintaining cooperation and common resource.