Incentive Mechanism Of Live Broadcasting Platform Under The Influence Of Anchoring Efforts

The paper combines the development status of the domestic live broadcast industry,explores the operational strategies of the live broadcast platform and the anchor,aims to build the operating mechanism of the live broadcast platform,and strives to increase the revenue of both parties by encouraging the anchor.This article mainly discusses several aspects of the different incentive mechanisms of live broadcast platform,the influence of network externalities on the choice of incentive strategies for live broadcast platforms,and the influence of risk preference on platform operations.The core content is divided into two parts.The first part focuses on the platform incentive strategy under network externality.Considering the network externalities and two types of the anchor wages(stimulated by the efforts and reward),a consumer utility function is constructed to study the behavior strategies in two kinds of incentive.The N1 model,the N2 model,the Y1 model and the Y2 model are constructed to discuss the influence of the network externality on the effort,reward,price and the profits of webcast platform and anchor,respectively.The study found that: according to the number of incentives,the network externalities are positively correlated with the efforts of the anchor,the product price,the number of reward and the income of the anchor and the platform.In accordance with the anchor efforts to encourage,the network externalities have no effect on the efforts of the anchor,the product price and the revenue of the anchor,but the amount of appreciation and the income of the platform will increase.The second part focuses on the platform incentive strategies with different risk preferences.Combine the operating model of the live broadcast platform with the principal-agent model,and consider the use of live broadcast platform use contracts in actual operations to motivate the anchor to perform live broadcasts.The study finds that the existing principal-agent models mostly stand on the platform for risk-neutral perspectives.In practice,the platform should take risk factors into consideration.The article establishes the principal-agent model from the perspective of risk aversion between the platform and the host,comparing the degree of incentive for the anchor when the platform is risk-neutral andrisk-avoiding,the level of effort of the anchor,the number of rewards for the consumers,and the change in the platform revenue.,from the perspective of the platform to give relevant recommendations.