Research On The Effect Of Stock-options Risk-Taking Incentives On Auditors' Risk Perception

As a major equity incentive model,stock options are widely used by more and more enterprises.However,there are a lot of researches on stock options in the academic circles at present,but there are relatively few studies on the incentive of insurers.Most of these researches are from the perspective of the enterprise.In this paper,according to "a risk-taking incentive of stock options--managers' risk decision behavior--auditor's risk perception behavior",this paper extends the research of risk-taking incentive to auditor's behavior,and research how stock-options risk-taking incentives affect the auditor's risk perception,in order to better understand the effect of risk-taking incentives on auditor behavior,while understanding the effect of risk-taking on managers' performance.This paper chooses the A-share listed companies that implemented the stock option incentive from 2006 to 2016 as the research sample,and studies stock-options risk-taking incentives,earnings manipulation,auditor's industry specilization and auditor's risk perception in a unified framework.The findings are as follows:(1)stock-options risk-taking incentives can significantly enhance the auditor's risk perception,which indicates that auditors should consider carefully the risk-taking incentive level set in the incentive program of stock options when auditing the audit risk.(2)Earnings manipulation has a intermediary role in the relationship between risk-taking incentive and auditor's risk perception,which shows that the stock options play a negative and negative impact in our country.(3)Auditor's industry specilization regulates the relationship between stock-options risk-taking incentives and auditor's risk perception.That is,the positive relationship between stock-options risk-taking incentives and auditor's risk perception is stronger when listed companies are audited by audit industry expertise than auditors with non-industry expertise.(4)Auditor's industry specilization will influence the relationship between stock-options risk-taking incentives and auditor's risk perception to act through earnings manipulation.That is,compared with auditors with non-industry specilization,At the auditor's auditing,the exposure of stock-options risk-taking incentives increases the auditor's risk perception by increasing the earnings manipulation.In this paper,we combine stock-options risk-taking incentives with the auditor's risk-sensing behavior and outline the mechanism of the risk-taking incentive that affects the risk perception of auditors,which is of certain reference value to the risk management of the accounting firm.