Executive Power、Accounting Information Quality And Investment Efficiency

As one of the important economic activities of enterprises to create value and increase wealth,investment plays an important role in the sustained and healthy development of enterprises.Investment decisions have a significant impact on corporate financing and dividend distribution policy.However,in modern enterprises,investment decisions will be affected by various factors.Scholars at home and abroad have found that the existence of the problem of information asymmetry and the principal-agent problem will seriously affect the efficiency of investment.Under the background of China’s corporate governance mechanism is not perfect,the phenomenon of non efficiency investment generally exists in China’s listed companies.So,how to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises has been the focus of attention of the relevant scholars.Previous studies have showed that high quality accounting information can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information and principal-agent problems,and the executive power is too large will increase these problems.The high quality of accounting information can alleviate the problem of information asymmetry between executives and investors,so investors are more timely and accurate understanding of the operating conditions of enterprises,thus the correct pricing,reduce inefficient investment behaviors of enterprises in the process of financing.At the same time,the high quality of accounting information is conducive to ease the principal-agent problem of corporate executives and business owners,is conducive to business owners supervision and incentive of executive behavior of non efficiency investment behavior to prevent executives.But in the listed companies,executives as the actual controller of the company,the company directly determines the future development policy and policy.The greater the executive power,the more corporate resources it controls,the more serious the opportunism behavior will be.Executives tend to use their own private interests,the use of power to conduct rent-seeking and performance manipulation,and ultimately harm the interests of enterprises and investors.From the research we can see that the executive power the greater the inhibition of the quality of accounting information can improve the efficiency of investment,this paper tries to point out the related research.In this paper,A shares of listed companies 2011-2015 data as sample,using the modified Jones model,Richardson model based measure of investment efficiency and the quality of accounting information,with two part-time staff,board size and equity dispersion index to measure the executive power.In this paper,the first use of normative research,the relevant literature review.Secondly it defines the related concepts in this paper,and based on the information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory and excessive investment and insufficient investment theory,theoretical analysis of the relationship between the executive power and the quality of accounting information and investment efficiency of the three,and put forward the hypothesis.Then,through the analysis of the former research,we determine the measurement method of the main variables in this paper.Then through empirical analysis to verify the hypotheses,and summarizes the research conclusions of this paper: the executive power is greater,more can reduce the investment efficiency of the enterprise;the quality of accounting information is higher,more can improve the efficiency of business investment;and the executive power is greater,more can weaken the effect of high quality accounting information on investment efficiency and this impact is mainly manifested in the quality of accounting information and the lack of investment to improve,while excessive investment in the enterprise,this relationship is not sure.The final analysis of the limitations of this paper,and gives the relevant policy recommendations: in order to overcome the problem of asymmetric information and agency problems,improve the efficiency of investment,in order for the enterprise and its stakeholders to create more value.We should not only from the information disclosure mechanism,incentive mechanism and other aspects of the internal supervision mechanism,improve the internal governance structure of enterprises,also need to strengthen the legal construction and external supervision to improve the external governance environment.