Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Neighborhood Avoidance Conflict Based On Risk Perception Perspective

With the remarkable growth of China's economy,the people's material living conditions have also been greatly improved.However,the number of public facilities currently built in China has been difficult to meet the needs of people's production and life.Local governments have also realized this problem and started to start public projects such as waste incineration plants and sewage treatment plants.However,these projects have brought positive impacts to the government and the people,and also brought environmental benefits to the residents around the facilities.Negative effects such as pollution and health concerns are so opposed to the opposition of residents around the facility,which may lead to malignant mass incidents.The academic community defines such opposition as a contiguous conflict.On the one hand,it is a public facility that needs to be built in the process of urbanization.On the other hand,it is a strong boycott of residents around the facility,which poses a major problem for the local government.Therefore,it is necessary to carry out research on the evolution of neighboring conflict avoidance,and to make neighboring avoidance strategies.The study found that the key reason for the conflict avoidance conflict is the public's perception of the risk of neighboring facilities.From the perspective of risk perception,this paper analyzes the relationship between neighboring conflict avoidance and risk perception.Based on the role of risk communication in risk perception,this paper studies the role of risk communication in the effective solution of neighboring conflict avoidance.According to the problem of municipal neighborhood avoidance facilities planning,the evolutionary game model of local government and surrounding residents is constructed.According to Friedman's equilibrium point stability test method,the stability analysis of the model is carried out,and the game is analyzed under nine conditions.The evolutionary form of the two strategies;the simulation results of four evolutionary stability strategies are demonstrated by Matlab numerical simulation analysis.Finally,according to the results of the evolutionary game and the "China-Thailand mass incident" of Yuhang Jiufeng in Hangzhou,the local government's risk communication can effectively guide the community residents to identify the construction of municipal neighboring facilities.Aiming at the role of risk communication in different stages of avoiding conflicts,using the evolutionary game theory,the diffusion equations in the early stage of the collision avoidance conflict and the convergence equations in the transition period are derived,which degenerate into equations containing learning obstacles.By expressing the learning obstacles of different strategies as a function of the degree of risk communication,this paper analyzes the role of local governments in adopting different levels of risk communication measures in different stages of avoiding conflicts.The results show that in the initial stage of the conflict avoidance conflict,the degree of communication of risk communication should be controlled,and the risk communication should be maximized during the transition period of the conflict,so that both sides of the game can quickly converge to a new stable equilibrium.The final solution to the problem of avoiding conflicts is inseparable from the local government's investment in risk communication measures.In the future planning of neighboring facilities,local governments should pay attention to this issue and strive to make every neighbor avoid project smoothly.Serving the development of the city.