Research On The Model And Stability Of Honest Or Dishonest Sellers’ Game Based On Evolutionary Theory

In recent years,China’s e-commerce has developed rapidly and the scale of the industry has continued to expand,it provided China with a large number of economic opportunities and promoted the optimization and upgrading of China’s economic industrial structure,and also drove the growth of China’s economy.However,many vendors are pursuing rapid profit growth,using the information asymmetry and virtuality of e-commerce platforms,destroying the reputation system of e-commerce platforms through various attack strategies,enhancing their trading reputation,and increasing transaction volume.Most of the existing credit defending strategies are implemented from the perspective of process or result governance through machine learning and other related technologies.Based on the relevant knowledge of game theory mechanism design field,this thesis proposes two evolution theory-based e-commerce seller’s honest/dishonest game models from the perspective of reducing the incentives for fraud.This article mainly has the following two aspects of research work.1)This thesis proposes a kind of the symmetric evolution of the seller’s honest/dishonest game model in the non-monopolistic e-commerce market.This thesis firstly analyzes the stability of the model,then simulates the simulation experiment,and shows the influence of various parameters(reward,punishment,etc.)in the model on the stability of the seller’s credit evolution in the e-commerce market.Results show that,from the perspective of motivation,relevant departments in the e-commerce exchange market increase inspection efforts,increase the probability of fraud detection,and adopt appropriate punishments and incentive measures to promote more sellers to choose trading strategy honestly and quickly.As the evolution proceeds,there will be no dishonest trading in the market finally.2)This thesis proposes a kind of the asymmetric evolution of the seller’s honest/dishonest game model in the monopolistic e-commerce market.This thesis firstly analyzes the stability of the model and then simulates the simulation experiment to verify the influence of the probability that sellers choose honest strategies on the stability of the credit evolution of e-commerce market.Finally,the experiment verifies the reward and penalty parameters on the stability of the model.Results show that increasing the probability that the monopolistic sellers choose honest strategies can promote the non-monopolistic of sellers to choose honest strategies,vice versa.It is also concludes that the development of the best incentives and penalties within the scope of appropriate penalties and rewards will enable the most rapid promotion of sellers(monopoly or non-monopoly)to choose honest trading strategies to make the market more honest development.