Study On The Effect And Evolutionary Game Of Anti-M&A Strategy-Based On Ikang

The global economic recovery has brought the sixth wave of mergers and acquisitions.With the rise of corporate mergers and acquisitions,hostile mergers and acquisitions for profit and corporate control have emerged.Compared with the maturity of foreign anti-M&A markets,China’s anti-M&A market is still at the stage of exploration,and there is much room for improvement in the macro environment and micro-subjects.The main aspects of the macro environment are: First,the legal framework of anti-M&A is vague.Second,China’s policy impose more support for M&A but restrictions on anti-M&A.The main aspects of the micro-subjects are as follows: First,most enterprises have a weak awareness and do not understand anti-M&A strategies.Second,some enterprise have a dispersed shareholding structure so that they are scattered and vulnerable to hostile M&A.In the uncertain market environment,many companies in China ended with failure in anti-hostile M&A.Therefore,the study of anti-M&A strategies will help Chinese enterprises more rationally and choose Suitable anti-M&A strategies.This paper selects ikang as the research object,analyzes the specific strategic influence of ikang ’s anti-M&A health,and conducts a game simulation of strategy choice.Firstly,it introduces the anti-M&A strategy that is generally adopted at home and abroad,and analyzes the macro-environment and micro-environment of China’s M&A market and anti-M&A market.It finds that there is a lack of relevant laws and regulations on anti-M&A in China,which leads to the legal use of Chinese enterprises.There are restrictions on the anti-M&A strategy,which directly causes most companies to fail to deal with anti-M&A rationally.Secondly,it introduces the history of ikang’s anti-M&A schedule and the motivation of the two enterprises,and further analyzes the short-term market reaction and long-term performance impact of the main anti-M&A strategy of ikang.Finally,based on the analysis of short-term market reaction and long-term performance,it build a evolutionary game model to simulate the optimal stability strategy of the two(ikang Guobin and Mei Nian Health)under the ―Poison Pill Plan‖ and ―White Knight Plan‖.And evaluate the differences between the best stability strategy and the actual choice.Through case analysis,the paper draws the following conclusions:(1)Ikang succeeded in anti-M&A,but privatization was hindered and its own development was hurt;(2)ikang’s ―poison pill plan‖ strategy was flawed;(3)iKang ’s "White Knight" program can promote the best stability strategy for both.This paper draws the following inspirations:(1)enterprises should establish an exante defense system;(2)enterprises should rationally deal with malicious mergers and acquisitions,and rationally apply anti-merger strategies;(3)China urgently needs to establish and improve anti-M&A laws and regulations;(4)China The regulatory body should improve the regulatory control system.The main contributions of this paper: based on the actual situation of the anti-M&A market,through introducing a evolutionary game to analysis anti-M&A cases and evaluation the implementation effect and game results of the anti-M&A strategy,and present the verification of the anti-M&A market behavior,provide reference about the choice and innovation of anti-M&A strategies for other Listed companies.