Research On Supply Chain Pricing And Coordination Considering Behavior Preference Under Carbon Trading

In the low-carbon economic environment,carbon trading makes carbon emission rights become commodities like other production resources that can be traded,increasing the cost or income of enterprises.Therefore,in the face of government carbon emission regulations and consumers' low-carbon preferences,carbon trading becomes an important means for supply chain enterprises to achieve the balance of environmental and economic benefits.In addition,due to the fluctuation of carbon trading price,it is necessary for supply chain enterprises to invest in emission reduction and improve carbon emission reduction technology to reduce the risks of carbon trading market and maintain the stability of carbon emission reduction cost.At the same time,the decision maker's behavior factors will also affect the decision-making results of the supply chain,if the behavior factors are not considered,the theoretical results will deviate from the actual situation.As common behavior preferences of decision makers,fairness concerns and risk aversion notonly affect the pricing and coordination of supply chain,but also affect the emission reduction decision of supply chain.Based on this,using Stackelberg dynamic game theory,this paper studies the pricing,carbon emission reduction and coordination of supply chain considering fairness concerns and risk aversion in the two-echelon low-carbon supply chain,and obtains the following conclusions:(1)Whether the decision makers are fairness concern or risk aversion or not,when the contract parameters meet certain conditions in different situations,the revenue-sharing cost-sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination.(2)When the decision makers are fairness neutral and risk neutral,the supply chain under centralized decision has higher carbon emission reduction rate and profit,as well as higher supply chain efficiency,providing consumers with more benefits;the carbon emission reduction rate is positively correlated with consumers' low carbon preference and carbon trading price,the profit of the supply chain and its members are negatively correlated with carbon trading price.(3)When considering the fairness concerns of decision makers,the retail price is positively correlated with the fairness concerns of manufacturer and retailer,the wholesale price is positively correlated with the manufacturer's fairness concerns,and the change of wholesale price with the retailer's fairness concerns is correlated with whethermanufacturer considers retailer's fairness concern;In addition,overall,the carbon emission reduction rate is negatively correlated with the fairness concerns of manufacturers and retailers;Manufacturer's fairness concern will lower profits of both supply chain members,and retailer's fairness concern can strive for more profit distribution for himself,but if manufacturer does not consider retailer's fairness concern,then both parties' profits will decrease at the same time.(4)When considering the risk aversion of decision makers,when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is large enough,the retail price is positively correlated with the risk aversion coefficient of manufacturer and retailer,the wholesale price is positively correlated with the manufacturer's risk aversion coefficient,and negatively correlated with the retailer's risk aversion coefficient;the carbon emission reduction rate and the expected profit of supply chain are positively correlated with the risk aversion coefficient of manufacturer and retailer under the centralized decision,and under the decentralized decision,the carbon emission reduction rate and manufacturer's expected profit are positively correlated with manufacturer's risk aversion coefficient,and negatively correlated with retailer's risk aversion coefficient,the change of retailer's expected profit is opposite to the change of manufacturer's expected profit.