Research On The Defects Of Corporate Governance And The Emptiness Of Large Shareholders

In modern corporate governance,there is a general problem of the control of large shareholders.It is an important object of Chinese enterprises to guard against and strictly manage the legislation,and is also an important research content to improve the governance of modern enterprises in China.The company's management has cut out the listed companies in different ways for their own interests,which seriously infringes the interests of the company investors.The agency conflict between the company management and the investors is more intense.At the same time,because of the weak regulatory measures and the existence of the exclusive system of Listed Companies in China,there are many problems in corporate governance,which leads to more severe internal control problems.The mechanism of China company based on corporate governance as the starting point,with the major Shareholders' Tunneling company acts as the research focus,to faway as a case,the implementation of in-depth analysis of the tunneling behavior.First analyzes the background and significance of this study,summarizes and reviews the research status of domestic and foreign scholars about the defects of corporate governance;secondly,this paper summarizes the concept and theoretical basis;third,this paper briefly introduces the case,in-depth discussion of the tunneling behavior of the specific means and economic consequences;finally,put forward the corresponding countermeasures.Faway case,the main reason for the existence of such tunneling behavior has three aspects: the characteristics of ownership structure of 1.listed companies in China;2.of China's listed companies corporate governance structure defects;3.third party supervision.Considering the current governance of Listed Companies in China,this study can provide a limited reference for the protection of the interests of the investors of the listed companies.Secondly,put forward the corresponding suggestions:(1)optimize the equity structure of listed companies China,improve the state-owned shares "dominance" of the situation;(2)to strengthen the external supervision;(3)improve the shareholder voting mechanism,improve the governance structure of listed companies,the effect of mutual restraint.