Research On Equity Incentive In Family Business And Non-family Business

At the same time of China’s rapid economic development,the number of family-owned enterprises in China has also increased year by year,and has shown a good development trend.As a powerful force to promote the rapid development of the domestic economy,family-owned enterprises play an important role in China’s economic development and make an indelible contribution to economic development.Although China’s financial market started late,it is developing very rapidly.As a common incentive mechanism,equity incentive has been widely used in corporate governance,and has achieved good incentive effects,improved corporate performance and promoted enterprises.In the process of family business continuous development and growth,many companies choose to adopt the equity incentive system to stabilize the company’s core personnel and reduce the agency problem.At the same time,however,due to the characteristics of the family business itself,it is more likely to have some problems in the design and implementation of the equity incentive plan.There may be problems such as self-employment benefits,benefit transfer,and harm to the interests of small and medium investors.Although academics are very rich in research on equity incentives,there are relatively few studies on equity incentives for family businesses.The research case selected in this paper is Supor.The representative of this case is that Supor himself experienced a change in the nature of equity from family holding to non-family holding,and implemented the equity incentive plan in both stages,which can play a good role in comparison.This paper compares the differences between design and incentive effects of three sets of equity incentive schemes in 2006,2013 and 2017: the scheme design is based on three aspects: incentive object and distribution situation,incentive mode and exercise difficulty.The difference analysis analyzes the incentive effects from four aspects: short-term market response,long-term financial performance,talent attraction and R&D innovation.Finally,I think about the reasons for the difference.Through analysis,it is found that the main reason for the differentiation is that the equity incentive system in the context of two property rights has different emphasis on the purpose,and the design motivation of the first set of equity incentive schemes implemented in the family enterprise stage exists for the self-employment of family members.The suspicion also caused the incentive effect that the incentive effect was worse than that of the non-family business,which further verified the shortcomings of Supor’s equity incentive plan designed during the family holding stage.