Study On Default Risk Of Asset Securitization Of Power Network Charging Right

Asset securitization,as a new financing mode of capital market,has been developing rapidly in China in recent years.According to statistics,in 2018,the number of asset securitization products issued in China was 796,and the financing scale was 174.677 billion yuan,which has really formed a trillion-scale market.However,with the continuous expansion of the stock size and the arrival of the peak payment,coupled with the downturn of the economy and the pressure of tightening supervision,the default risk of asset securitization gradually exposed.Since the first substantive breach of contract appeared in 2016,credit risk incidents of asset securitization have occurred frequently.Many ABS projects with "impossible breach of contract" have occurred default risk incidents one after another,which makes us have to start to pay attention to the default risk of asset securitization.Firstly,this paper combs the development of asset securitization market and the current situation of default in China,and finds that default risk events mainly occur in the ABS project of charging right.So this paper chooses the typical default case of ABS project of Pingyin Kaidi Power Network Charging Right,analyses the feasibility of ABS financing for power enterprises,and draws three advantages of ABS financing for power enterprises: Power assets can generate stable cash flow,basic assets meet the legal norms and meet the requirements of the development of China’s financial market.On this basis,a case study of the default cases selected in this paper is carried out.After introducing the background and motivation of the establishment of the special plan,the transaction structure design and credit mechanism of the special plan are analyzed,and the existing problems of the special plan are further analyzed.It is found that the main reasons for the default are as follows: First,the frequency of the payment of the special plan is not consistent.Reasons lead to excessive cash flow deposits;second,special plans can not completely achieve risk isolation;third,credit enhancement mechanism has high-risk defects.Finally,the Z-Score quantitative model was used to measure the default risk of the special plan,and it was found that the sponsor of the special plan,Kaidi Ecology,was on the verge of bankruptcy when the project was established,and had no guarantee capability at all.The original stakeholders of the special plan had poor profitability,high financial leverage,almost exhausted cash flow,lacked sustainability and highly depended on the parent company Kaidi Ecology.Financial support.Such a situation even got the AA + rating when the project was established,and the final default undoubtedly sounded an alarm bell for our risk identification.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward reasonable suggestions from the five perspectives of legislators,regulators,issuers,investors and managers.It has guiding significance for the supervision,issuance,especially the supervision and issuance of equity ABS in China.Firstly,legislators should improve relevant laws and regulations and strengthen information disclosure;secondly,regulators should implement differentiated supervision according to the risk characteristics of basic assets;thirdly,issuers should rationally design the structure of special plans and pay attention to the effectiveness of risk isolation measures;fourthly,investors should improve their risk identification ability to reduce the losses caused by default;finally,management.People should establish and improve risk early warning mechanism and default handling mechanism to improve asset management ability.