Research On Design Of Engineering Bidding Mechanism Based On Reverse Multi-attribute Online Auction

As a distribution method,the construction project bidding system not only helps construction enterprises obtain higher profits,but also improves the quality of engineering projects.How to achieve a fair and effective distribution of engineering projects is the key to bidding.At present,there are still many unfair phenomena in the allocation of engineering projects in China.In this regard,in the context of the only bidder and multiple contractors,this paper proposes a project bidding mechanism based on online multiattribute auctions.The research contents and innovations of this article are as follows:(1)On the premise of the tenderer dividing a large complex project into multiple identical bidding sections,a reverse multi-attribute online auction mechanism was designed.First,considering the multiple attributes of quality,construction period,safe construction,environmental protection,and construction plan,and when the contractor enters and leaves the auction platform at any time,a reverse multi-attribute online auction mechanism model that can make instant decisions is established,and On this basis,a reverse multi-attribute online auction mechanism suitable for project bidding is proposed;secondly,it is proved that the mechanism meets the characteristics of incentive compatibility and individual rationality;finally,the application of the mechanism in engineering project allocation is verified by examples.(2)In view of the fact that some contractors need multiple relevant bidding sections in order to improve efficiency,this paper designs an engineering project allocation mechanism based on online combined auction.First,under the assumption that the contractor leaves and arrives at the auction platform at any time,and proposes a variety of engineering project needs,with the goal of maximizing social surplus,an online multiattribute combination auction mechanism design model is constructed and the corresponding mechanism is given;second,Theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism can incentivize bidders to report their own costs and arrival and departure times,and at the same time can attract bidders to participate in the auction voluntarily.Finally,combined with a specific engineering project allocation case,the operability of the relevant data demonstration mechanism is substituted.