Study On The Adverse Selection Of China’s Medical Insurance Market And Its Heterogeneity

In recent years,with the rapid development of China’s economy,the awareness of health has been strengthened,China’s medical insurance market has been vigorously developed,premium income increased year by year.However,China’s medical insurance payment amount and payment rate also rise,and the growth rate exceeds the growth rate of premium income,which will greatly restrict the sustainable development of the health insurance market in our country,the welfare of the people will be affected.A large number of scholars have shown that adverse selection behavior is the main factor that leads to the rapid growth of the medical insurance market.Adverse selection behavior of the insurance market refers to a higher proportion of people with high health risk preferring to buy medical insurance.High risk will lead to high prevalence,which makes the amount of claims continue to rise.In order to continue to operate,insurance company have to increase the premium,while higher premiums will make low risk people out of the scope of the insured,the insurance market finally left more high risk population,with the cycle continues,the healthy development of the insurance market will face a huge challenge.Base on the Chinese health and Nutrition Survey(CHNS)data,this paper will use fixed effect probit model to analyze the adverse selection behavior of our city and the rural medical insurance market,and the adverse selection behavior effects of heterogeneity in different income,different age and gender.The results show that:compared with the basic medical insurance market,the commercial health insurance market has a higher degree of adverse selection.In addition,the heterogeneity analysis results show that the insured in social basic medical insurance mainly concentrated in medium-income and low-income people,commercial health insurance are mainly concentrated in high income groups;different age groups all have adverse selection behavior in the basic medical insurance market,but with age increasing,the degree of adverse selection gradually decreases.While the commercial health insurance market adverse selection behavior is mainly concentrated in the group of 35～50 age;in the social basic medical insurance,women have a higher degree of adverse selection,this means the consciousness of speculation on female is more obvious,but in the commercial health insurance market,only the male in city have adverse selection behavior.